Malicious code in gcli-control (PyPI)

Overview

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (b8bd4de0b73d7df676127ce8c632117fc7ea8d008bf941fb7d385f67a84f8d67)

The package installs and runs a host daemon (python -m gcli host) that polls a shared JSON document at api.npoint.io for commands, decrypts them, executes them on the installer's machine, and posts encrypted results back. Any party who writes to that shared document controls full-host code execution on every daemon polling it. host.py hardcodes a default rendezvous bin ID 599ac3c39189fcc26e5a shared across all installers who do not override it, and crypto.py implements a __BYPASS__ password sentinel with a BY: base64-only path that disables AES-GCM entirely, allowing anonymous unauthenticated command injection against every daemon on the default bin. The command dispatcher exposes 200+ operations invokable through this channel, including browser_passwords, browser_cookies, keylog_start/read/save, webcam_capture, shell_history, wifi_password, screenshot, and users add/change_password (credential and secret harvesting); and install_startup/install_scheduled/install_watchdog writing Windows Run keys, systemd user services, cron entries, and startup-folder launchers that relaunch python -m gcli host on boot, plus an elevator module offering elevate_uac / elevate_sudo / persist_admin for privilege escalation. The combination is a full remote-access trojan: remote command execution, credential/browser-secret exfiltration, keylogging and webcam capture, boot persistence, and privilege elevation, all reachable by any party who knows the default rendezvous bin.

Affected packages

• gcli-control

Remediation

Refer to the advisory for the patched release.