{"id":"MAL-2026-12502","title":"Malicious code in gcli-control (PyPI)","summary":"Malicious code in gcli-control (PyPI)","severity":"none","vendor":"gcli-control","product":"gcli-control","ecosystem":"pip","affected":["gcli-control"],"published":"2026-08-05","updated":"2026-08-05","source":"OSV","sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-12502","references":[{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/gcli-control/0.12.2/"},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/gcli-control/0.5.0/"},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/gcli-control/0.12.4/"},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/gcli-control/0.11.1/"}],"tags":["osv","pip"],"ingestedAt":"2026-08-05T19:12:55.311Z","slug":"MAL-2026-12502","body":"## Overview\n\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (b8bd4de0b73d7df676127ce8c632117fc7ea8d008bf941fb7d385f67a84f8d67)\nThe package installs and runs a host daemon (`python -m gcli host`) that polls a shared JSON document at api.npoint.io for commands, decrypts them, executes them on the installer's machine, and posts encrypted results back. Any party who writes to that shared document controls full-host code execution on every daemon polling it. host.py hardcodes a default rendezvous bin ID `599ac3c39189fcc26e5a` shared across all installers who do not override it, and crypto.py implements a `__BYPASS__` password sentinel with a `BY:` base64-only path that disables AES-GCM entirely, allowing anonymous unauthenticated command injection against every daemon on the default bin. The command dispatcher exposes 200+ operations invokable through this channel, including browser_passwords, browser_cookies, keylog_start/read/save, webcam_capture, shell_history, wifi_password, screenshot, and users add/change_password (credential and secret harvesting); and install_startup/install_scheduled/install_watchdog writing Windows Run keys, systemd user services, cron entries, and startup-folder launchers that relaunch `python -m gcli host` on boot, plus an elevator module offering elevate_uac / elevate_sudo / persist_admin for privilege escalation. The combination is a full remote-access trojan: remote command execution, credential/browser-secret exfiltration, keylogging and webcam capture, boot persistence, and privilege elevation, all reachable by any party who knows the default rendezvous bin.\n\n\n## Affected packages\n\n- `gcli-control`\n\n## Remediation\n\nRefer to the advisory for the patched release.","depth":"sunlit","depthScore":3,"depthScoreParts":{"impact":2.8,"likelihood":0,"exploitation":0,"ransomware":0},"changes":[]}