RUSTSEC-2026-0365High· 7.5▾ TwilightRemote DoS through unchecked `IdList` allocation in negentropy
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 41.3 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
The negentropy crate is vulnerable to denial-of-service through an unchecked, peer-controlled ID count in reconciliation messages.
With the std feature enabled, which is the default configuration, a small malformed message can trigger an enormous memory allocation and terminate the application.
When processing an IdList range, the reconciliation parser uses the peer-provided ID count to reserve memory before checking whether the message contains the corresponding IDs:
let mut their_elems: HashSet<Id> =
HashSet::with_capacity(num_ids as usize);
An attacker can declare an arbitrarily large count without supplying any IDs. The allocation occurs before the parser reaches the ID-reading loop, which would otherwise reject the truncated message.
With Rust's default allocation-error behavior, a failed allocation aborts the process rather than unwinding. Consequently, catch_unwind cannot contain the failure.
Both reconcile and reconcile_with_ids reach the vulnerable parser.
The patched versions validate the count against the remaining message length before allocating:
if num_ids > (query.len() / ID_SIZE) as u64 {
return Err(Error::ParseEndsPrematurely);
}
An unauthenticated remote attacker can terminate an application that exposes reconciliation to untrusted peers without additional validation.
For example, a Nostr relay that forwards NEG-OPEN or NEG-MSG reconciliation payloads to the vulnerable parser can be taken down by a single client message. Clients processing messages from malicious relays are also exposed.
This specific vulnerability affects builds with the default std feature enabled. Builds without std use a BTreeSet and do not perform the vulnerable preallocation.
A message-size limit alone does not prevent exploitation because the malicious payload can be only a few bytes long.
Discovered and fixed by Alex Gleason (https://github.com/alexgleason).
negentropy >= 0.5.0, < 0.5.2Upgrade to a patched release:
negentropy 0.5.2