Unauthenticated ServerHello can downgrade later connections to classical key exchange

Overview

The client recorded the server-selected key exchange group for each server name when processing the ServerHello, before the server was authenticated. This record is used to predict which key share to send in future ClientHellos to that server name.

A network attacker can answer one connection attempt with a ServerHello selecting X25519, and then close the connection. Later ClientHellos for that name carry only an X25519 key share, while supported_groups still lists X25519MLKEM768 first. If the genuine server accepts that share rather than sending a HelloRetryRequest for its preferred hybrid group, the handshake completes with classical-only key exchange and no error. This persists for as long as the entry stays in the client's session store.

The impact is loss of post-quantum confidentiality for affected connections ("harvest now, decrypt later"). There is no key compromise and no authentication bypass.

The following are not affected:

• connections to servers which send a HelloRetryRequest for their preferred group,
• clients with resumption disabled (as nothing is stored), and
• other server names.

This behaviour is discussed in draft-ietf-tls-key-share-prediction, so the practical impact depends largely on server policy.

Affected packages

• rustls >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.23.46

Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

• rustls 0.23.46