---
id: MAL-2026-17180
title: Malicious code in my-private-pkg (PyPI)
summary: Malicious code in my-private-pkg (PyPI)
severity: critical
exploited: true
vendor: my-private-pkg
product: my-private-pkg
ecosystem: pip
affected:
  - my-private-pkg
published: '2026-09-25'
updated: '2026-09-25'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-25T14:30:05.761879412Z'
source: OSV
sourceUrl: 'https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17180'
references:
  - url: 'https://pypi.org/project/my-private-pkg/99.1.1/'
  - url: >-
      https://hyena-dashboard-314003657440.asia-northeast3.run.app/#/report/f6466201-aa5b-4136-b458-f88e7b9b4575?period=30&eco=all&tab=summary&return=%23%2Freports%3Fperiod%3D30%26eco%3Dall%26verdict%3Dmalicious
  - url: 'https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/my-private-pkg'
  - url: 'https://pypi.org/project/my-private-pkg/0.1.1/'
tags:
  - osv
  - pip
  - malware
ingestedAt: '2026-09-25T07:17:06.725Z'
---

## Overview

Version 99.1.1 of my-private-pkg executes a custom setuptools install hook while a wheel is built. The hook launches my_private_pkg/index.py, which collects the current username, working directory, hostname, resolved local IP address, operating system, and machine architecture, then attempts to POST the resulting JSON to a hard-coded Webhook.site request collector. Dynamic analysis observed the wheel build spawn this script followed immediately by network activity. The package's public metadata describes it only as a private Python package and does not disclose the collection or transmission.

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (d8008c5637dfae2dfc4162f1dd5152c5e90e03b0fc8593fda5055f44e9745b22)
setup.py registers a custom install command (PostInstallCommand) that runs my_private_pkg/index.py automatically on `pip install`. That script gathers installer-side identifiers — os.getlogin(), socket.gethostname(), local IP address, os.getcwd(), platform.system() and platform.machine() — and POSTs them as JSON to a hardcoded collector URL at https://webhook.site/d4d1b01b-708a-40b9-b8c8-187eeecafeed. A duplicate of the exfiltration payload is shipped as vercel_runtime_python/index.py, and vercel_runtime_python/__init__.py contains the same PostInstallCommand wiring referencing my_private_pkg/index.py; the module name mimics Vercel's Python runtime. The package name and the internal vercel_runtime_python module name are consistent with a dependency-confusion lure targeting an internal `my-private-pkg` name and Vercel's runtime namespace: the only on-install effect is a reconnaissance beacon to an attacker-controlled webhook.site endpoint identifying the host that mistakenly resolved the public name.

## Source: kam193 (b9272fe1642ca0e3b8b1cfcf930ca69b08119ed258cdc760f9ad8a014b76767b)
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.


---

Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.


Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.


 - The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.


## Affected packages

- `my-private-pkg`

## Remediation

Refer to the advisory for the patched release.