MAL-2026-16219Critical▾ Abyssal⚠ Exploited in the wildMalicious code in licloud (PyPI)
▾ Abyssal zone — Critical with a public exploit or in-the-wild use
impact 52.3 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 18
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Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
setup.py unconditionally collects the installer's OS name, username, and hostname and POSTs them to a hardcoded plain-HTTP bare-IP endpoint (http://182.92.143.23/collect.php) before invoking setup(). The beacon fires on pip install without user consent and is unrelated to the package's stated purpose (an 'LLM gateway SDK'). The destination is a bare IP over cleartext HTTP, not a documented publisher endpoint, and the payload identifies the installer host (os, user, host) with a package tag for follow-on targeting.
Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.
Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.
Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest
Reasons (based on the campaign):
The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.
The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.
licloudRefer to the advisory for the patched release.