Malicious code in company-sdk (PyPI)

Overview

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Source: amazon-inspector (46a5156bc1c582f0be8c1c33340b338cba12276dd9ea90235210fbc2ff950c85)

company_sdk.py executes credential-harvesting code at module import time. It walks the installer's home directory reading SSH keys (/.ssh), cloud credentials (/.aws, ~/.azure, /.config/gcloud), package manager tokens (/.npmrc, ~/.pypirc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass), Docker/Kube configs,.env files, Vault/Terraform tokens, and shell history, and enumerates process environment variables whose names match credential keywords (TOKEN, SECRET, KEY, PASSWORD, AWS_, GITHUB_, etc.). The collected material is gzip-compressed, XOR-encrypted with a keystream derived via PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 from a hardcoded 32-byte hex passphrase, HMAC-tagged, and base64-encoded. The drop() function then POSTs the encrypted blob to https://api.github.com/gists using a hardcoded ghp-prefixed GitHub Personal Access Token as the Bearer credential, with TLS verification explicitly disabled (ssl.CERT_NONE). The upload runs unconditionally on import inside a bare try/except so failures are silent. Using GitHub Gist as the drop channel routes the exfiltration through a domain that typically bypasses egress filtering, and encrypting the payload with an author-only key conceals contents from network inspection.

Source: kam193 (f4b45f8532bf4a1b0b6a1b987a12b2ab7e4b626351b48bfffb159beed150983e)

During import, package exfiltrates sensitive files, credentials and env variables to a private GitHub Gist.

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Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.

Campaign: 2026-09-company-sdk

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• exfiltration-env-variables

• files-exfiltration

• exfiltration-credentials

• exfiltration-ssh-keys

Affected packages

• company-sdk

Remediation

Refer to the advisory for the patched release.