Malicious code in atlas-internal (PyPI)

Overview

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Source: amazon-inspector (cdd4a17504623add1ff4f374ea9c2283d1eb5a863265e012592142b169cd9d90)

setup.py overrides the egg_info command to execute automatically during pip install. The overridden command collects the installer's hostname, current working directory, and OS username, URL-encodes them, and sends them via an HTTP GET request to a hardcoded Interactsh out-of-band callback subdomain at fpvbsifkklbmklusmxby2405wa7x7x5bf.oast.fun. This fires on default install without user interaction and leaks installer host identifiers to an attacker-controlled OOB server, consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon.

Source: kam193 (e41b6a5ae4af745c6bc5b2514fa7202d95242ef71a60a57f130524ccfddc99da)

Installing the package or importing the module exfiltrates basic information about the host, and the package has no other purpose.

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Category: PROBABLY_PENTEST - Packages looking like typical pentest packages, but also anything that looks like testing, exploring pre-prepared kits, research & co, with clearly low-harm possibilities.

Campaign: GENERIC-standard-pypi-install-pentest

Reasons (based on the campaign):

• The package contains code to exfiltrate basic data from the system, like IP or username. It has a limited risk.

• The package overrides the install command in setup.py to execute malicious code during installation.

Affected packages

• atlas-internal

Remediation

Refer to the advisory for the patched release.