GHSA-v53p-9fqp-m79jHigh· 7.5▾ TwilightNodemailer: Quadratic backtracking in the addressparser free-text fallback allows remote denial of service
▾ Twilight zone — High severity, or a signal on a lesser flaw
impact 41.3 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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When addressparser finds no address by its strict reading, it falls back to pulling one out of the free text with /\s*\b[^@\s]+@[^\s]+\b\s*/. That pattern backtracks quadratically: [^@\s]+ is retried from every offset and rescans the run to the next @ each time. A single header value holding a long whitespace-free run with no usable @ blocks the Node.js event loop for tens of seconds.
It is cheaper to exploit than GHSA-prgh-xp8r-p3m5: 273KB is enough for ~43s, where the comment-joined shape needed ~1.5MB for ~10s.
The fallback in src/addressparser/index.ts ran the pattern as a search. [^@\s]+ crosses neither whitespace nor @, so from each start offset it scans forward to the next @ or to the end of the run and then fails, and the engine simply advances one character and repeats. Three shapes make every offset fail:
@ at all@ has nothing after it@ has nothing before itA fourth reaches it with a valid address present but placed past a long run, so the long run is walked before the match is found.
const addressparser = require('nodemailer/lib/addressparser');
const s = Date.now();
addressparser(' >' + '>[x][x]'.repeat(40000)); // 273KB
console.log(Date.now() - s, 'ms'); // ~43000 ms, blocking
Measured on 10.0.5:
| Value | Parse time |
|---|---|
'[x]'.repeat(40000) (117KB) | 9.0 s |
'[x]'.repeat(40000) + '@' (117KB) | 8.9 s |
'@' + '[x]'.repeat(40000) (117KB) | 8.8 s |
' >' + '>[x][x]'.repeat(40000) (273KB) | 42.9 s |
Algorithmic-complexity denial of service. Node is single threaded, so the block stalls the whole process. Reachable without authentication anywhere inbound header values are handed to this parser, mailparser being the notable case, and reachable from application input wherever a user-supplied string is used as a message address, since mime-node parses to, from and cc when composing.
The search is replaced by a single linear pass that finds the one offset the pattern can match at, which is then applied there with a sticky regex. Match results are unchanged, verified against the previous implementation over 3.4 million random strings comparing both the match offset and the matched text, plus 800k full-parse comparisons.
Found while validating the report in GHSA-prgh-xp8r-p3m5, not reported externally.
nodemailer <= 10.0.5Upgrade to a patched release:
nodemailer 10.0.6Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
CVE-2026-100700High· 7.5nodemailer before 10.0.6 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the addressparser free-text fallback regex pattern that exhibits quadratic backtracking behavior
CVE-2026-90776High· 7.5Nodemailer versions 9.1.0 through 10.0.4 contain a quadratic time complexity vulnerability in the addressparser component when parsing email addresses with RFC 5322 comments
GHSA-2x7j-588g-ccc2High· 7.5Nodemailer: Quadratic (O(n²)) time complexity in addressparser allows remote denial of service via a crafted address list
GHSA-g57g-f23g-4646Medium· 5.3Nodemailer: Quoted local-part can produce malformed envelope recipient through RFC 5322 comment parsing
GHSA-8vvx-rff5-p5rqMedium· 5.9Nodemailer: Nested structured recipient arrays bypass the parser depth limit and cause stack exhaustion DoS
GHSA-6vj9-mwq6-2f5vMedium· 5.9Nodemailer: Process-global DNS cache reuses TLS `servername` across transports, enabling cross-tenant SMTP credential disclosure