---
id: GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f
title: ' Budibase: SSO OAuth2 Token Leakage via User Metadata Endpoints to Power-Role Users'
summary: ' Budibase: SSO OAuth2 Token Leakage via User Metadata Endpoints to Power-Role Users'
severity: medium
cvss: 4.9
cwe:
  - CWE-200
vendor: budibase
product: '@budibase/server'
ecosystem: npm
affected:
  - '@budibase/server < 3.39.25'
patched:
  - '@budibase/server 3.39.25'
published: '2026-07-24'
updated: '2026-07-24'
source: GHSA
sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f
  - url: 'https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19110'
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/7b8ba11a2c8b233c35e7728dd752dba25ef919a4
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/80a31f6c3354620aa90e50af8a2c614333084621
  - url: 'https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.25'
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f'
tags:
  - ghsa
  - npm
ingestedAt: '2026-07-24T21:39:14.419Z'
---

## Overview

## Summary

The `/api/users/metadata` and `/api/users/metadata/:id` endpoints in `@budibase/server` return full global user profiles to any user with POWER role or above. For SSO-authenticated users (OIDC, Google), the response includes `oauth2.accessToken` and `oauth2.refreshToken` fields, leaking identity provider credentials to other users who should not have access to them.

## Details

When a user authenticates via SSO (OIDC or Google), the OAuth2 tokens are stored in the global CouchDB user document at `packages/backend-core/src/auth/auth.ts:170-173`:

```typescript
dbUser.oauth2 = {
  ...dbUser.oauth2,
  ...details,
}
await db.put(dbUser)
```

The user metadata endpoints are protected by `PermissionType.USER, PermissionLevel.READ` (`packages/server/src/api/routes/user.ts:11`), which maps to the POWER permission set (`packages/backend-core/src/security/permissions.ts:99`).

**Path 1 — List all users** (`GET /api/users/metadata`):
1. `controller.fetchMetadata` → `sdk.users.fetchMetadata()` (`packages/server/src/sdk/users/utils.ts:78`)
2. → `getGlobalUsers()` → `getRawGlobalUsers()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:101-122`) — strips only `password` and `forceResetPassword`
3. → `processUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15-76`) — strips only `password` and `roles`
4. The `oauth2` field containing `accessToken` and `refreshToken` is **never removed**

**Path 2 — Single user** (`GET /api/users/metadata/:id`):
1. `controller.findMetadata` → `getFullUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/users.ts:6`)
2. → `getGlobalUser()` → `getRawGlobalUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:90-92`) — raw CouchDB fetch, **no field stripping at all**
3. → `processUser()` — strips only `password` and `roles`
4. Same result: `oauth2` tokens are returned

There is no output sanitization middleware on these routes that would strip sensitive fields before the response reaches the client.

## PoC

**Prerequisites:** A Budibase instance with at least one SSO-authenticated user (OIDC or Google) and a separate user with POWER role in an app.

**Step 1 — As the POWER user, list all users:**
```bash
curl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata' \
  -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<power-user-jwt>' \
  -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_<appid>' | jq '.[].oauth2'
```

**Expected output:** `null` for all users (tokens should not be exposed)

**Actual output:** For SSO users, the response includes:
```json
{
  "accessToken": "ya29.a0ARrdaM...",
  "refreshToken": "1//0eXxXxXxXx..."
}
```

**Step 2 — Fetch a specific SSO user's profile:**
```bash
curl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata/ro_ta_users_us_<sso-user-id>' \
  -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<power-user-jwt>' \
  -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_<appid>' | jq '.oauth2'
```

This also returns the full OAuth2 tokens.

## Impact

- A user with POWER role in any app can read **all SSO users' OAuth2 access tokens and refresh tokens** via the list endpoint, without needing to know individual user IDs.
- Stolen access tokens can be used to access external identity provider resources (Google Workspace, Azure AD, Okta-protected services) as the victim user.
- Refresh tokens allow indefinite token renewal, persisting access even after the original access token expires.
- Additionally, `admin`, `builder`, `tenantId`, `ssoId`, and `userGroups` fields are leaked, revealing the full authorization topology of the instance.

## Recommended Fix

Strip sensitive SSO fields in `processUser()` at `packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15`:

```typescript
export async function processUser(
  user: ContextUser,
  opts: { appId?: string; groups?: UserGroup[] } = {}
) {
  if (!user || (!user.roles && !user.userGroups)) {
    return user
  }
  user = cloneDeep(user)
  delete user.password
+ delete (user as any).oauth2
+ delete (user as any).provider
+ delete (user as any).providerType
+ delete (user as any).thirdPartyProfile
+ delete (user as any).profile
+ delete (user as any).ssoId
+ delete (user as any).forceResetPassword
  // ... rest of function
```

Additionally, `getRawGlobalUsers()` at line 101 should also strip `oauth2` alongside its existing `password`/`forceResetPassword` stripping for defense in depth.

## Affected packages

- `@budibase/server < 3.39.25`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `@budibase/server 3.39.25`