---
id: GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332
title: >-
  grok-faf-mcp has an arbitrary local file read via unconfined `path` argument
  in FAF tools
summary: >-
  grok-faf-mcp has an arbitrary local file read via unconfined `path` argument
  in FAF tools
severity: high
cvss: 7.5
cwe:
  - CWE-22
  - CWE-73
  - CWE-200
vendor: grok-faf-mcp
product: grok-faf-mcp
ecosystem: npm
affected:
  - grok-faf-mcp <= 1.5.2
patched:
  - grok-faf-mcp 1.5.3
published: '2026-08-19'
updated: '2026-08-19'
source: GHSA
sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/Wolfe-Jam/grok-faf-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332
  - url: 'https://github.com/Wolfe-Jam/grok-faf-mcp/releases/tag/v1.5.3'
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cc2g-gq8c-r332'
tags:
  - ghsa
  - npm
ingestedAt: '2026-08-19T19:44:03.406Z'
---

## Overview

### Summary
Several `grok-faf-mcp` MCP tools accept a caller-controlled `path` argument and resolve it (`~` expansion + `path.resolve()`) straight into a filesystem read **without confining it to a trusted project directory**. An absolute path or `../` traversal is resolved and used as-is, so the server process can be made to read files outside the intended `.faf` project context. The only remaining limit is OS file permissions.

### Affected tools
`refresh_faf`, `faf_score`, `faf_get_orchestration_policy`, `refresh_blend` (and the shared `getProjectPath()` chokepoint feeding the `.faf` tools), plus the general-purpose `faf_read` / `faf_write` file tools (denylist-only; an absolute path still reached home-directory secrets, and `faf_write` could write outside the project). `refresh_faf` echoes the file contents verbatim back to the caller as "fresh DNA"; `faf_get_orchestration_policy` reflects values parsed out of the attacker-chosen file and echoes the resolved absolute path — confirming the read.

### Impact
An MCP client — or an LLM prompt-injected via attacker-controlled content (a web page, README, ticket, or `.faf`) into issuing a tool call — can read any file the server process can read: SSH keys (`~/.ssh/id_rsa`), cloud credentials (`~/.aws/credentials`), `.env` files, source, `/etc/passwd`. This is a sensitive-information-disclosure (CWE-200) primitive that far exceeds the declared `.faf` project-context scope. The server runs over stdio, so the read is reached by a crafted tool call (e.g. a prompt-injected agent processing attacker-controlled content).

### Patches
Fixed in **1.5.3** by confining every caller-supplied `path` before any filesystem access (`safe-path.ts`):
- Reads are restricted to `.faf` / `.fafm` context files, so non-context files (secrets) are refused regardless of directory.
- General file ops (`faf_read` / `faf_write`) are confined to the project root (cwd + system temp; override with `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS`).
- Paths are canonicalized through symlinks (closing the symlink bypass); absolute paths and `../` escapes are rejected.

Upgrade: `npm install -g grok-faf-mcp@1.5.3` (or `bunx grok-faf-mcp`).

### Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, run the server only against trusted local projects, and set `FAF_ALLOWED_ROOTS` (patched versions) to a single project directory for a hard directory boundary.

### Credits
Discovered and responsibly reported via coordinated disclosure by **Zhihao Zhang** (Worcester Polytechnic Institute).

## Affected packages

- `grok-faf-mcp <= 1.5.2`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `grok-faf-mcp 1.5.3`