---
id: GHSA-96h4-vgxj-gvm2
title: 'Nest: Unbounded memory growth in the NestJS TCP microservice transport'
summary: 'Nest: Unbounded memory growth in the NestJS TCP microservice transport'
severity: medium
cvss: 6.5
cwe:
  - CWE-770
vendor: nestjs
product: '@nestjs/microservices'
ecosystem: npm
affected:
  - '@nestjs/microservices < 11.2.5'
  - '@nestjs/microservices >= 12.0.0, < 12.0.3'
patched:
  - '@nestjs/microservices 11.2.5'
  - '@nestjs/microservices 12.0.3'
published: '2026-09-30'
updated: '2026-09-30'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-30T14:44:24Z'
source: GHSA
sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-96h4-vgxj-gvm2'
references:
  - url: 'https://github.com/nestjs/nest/security/advisories/GHSA-96h4-vgxj-gvm2'
  - url: 'https://github.com/nestjs/nest/pull/17746'
  - url: 'https://github.com/nestjs/nest/pull/17749'
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/nestjs/nest/commit/6ca2dd894a6ff964d318724f363061652e822920
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/nestjs/nest/commit/781843ac98d429fe1d541c52c7126850be5989a7
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/nestjs/nest/commit/dee4ed4dbc2e18e1e722619927647f5441dfe812
  - url: 'https://github.com/nestjs/nest/releases/tag/v11.2.5'
  - url: 'https://github.com/nestjs/nest/releases/tag/v12.0.3'
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-96h4-vgxj-gvm2'
tags:
  - ghsa
  - npm
ingestedAt: '2026-09-30T15:07:05.372Z'
---

## Overview

## Summary

A peer that can open a TCP connection to a NestJS microservice using the built-in TCP
transport can make the server process allocate memory without limit, on either side of the
connection, until the process is killed by the OS or by its container memory limit. No
authentication, no credentials, and no valid message are required.

Applications are affected only if they start a microservice with `Transport.TCP` and the
transport's port is reachable by an untrusted peer.


## Affected versions

| Package | Affected | Patched |
|---|---|---|
| `@nestjs/microservices` | `>= 12.0.0, < 12.0.3` | **12.0.3** |
| `@nestjs/microservices` | `< 11.2.5` | **11.2.5** |

The same code is present in the 10.x line and earlier. Those lines are end-of-life and
will not receive a patch; upgrade to a supported major.

Only `@nestjs/microservices` is affected. No other package needs updating for this issue.

## Details

Two independent paths let one peer grow the heap without bound.

### Partial packets are buffered with nothing to reap them

The TCP transport frames messages as `<length>#<payload>`. A peer may declare a length,
send part of the payload, and then stop. `JsonSocket` keeps the partial payload buffered
while it waits for the rest, and nothing ever reclaimed it: there was no socket timeout, no
cap on the number of connections, and no tracking of accepted sockets.

`maxBufferSize` did not close this. It caps a single connection, defaulting to 128M
characters, and is enforced per connection, so the effective ceiling was the number of
connections an attacker chose to open.

Ten connections that each send 20MB and then go silent:

| | rss | heapUsed |
|---|---|---|
| baseline | 152.3MB | 28.1MB |
| after 200MB sent, all stalled | 561.2MB | 229.5MB |

The memory was held for as long as the connections stayed open. Closing them released it,
so a peer could hold it indefinitely at negligible cost to itself.

### Response backpressure was ignored

`JsonSocket#handleSend` discarded the return value of `socket.write`. A peer that issues
requests and never reads the responses therefore made the process queue every response in
memory, with no ceiling and no signal to stop producing more.

Thirty requests from a client whose stream is paused, against a handler returning an 8MB
payload, grew rss from 152.4MB to 419.1MB. The amplification here is roughly 1:1, because
the response size is set by the application rather than by the attacker; the defect is that
the server buffers all of it rather than applying backpressure or giving up.

## Impact

An unauthenticated peer that can reach the transport's port can drive the process to an
out-of-memory kill. Under a container memory limit this is fast and repeatable, and it
restarts the pod rather than merely degrading it.

There is no confidentiality or integrity impact. Nothing is read, written, or executed;
the failure mode is availability only.

Applications are not affected if the TCP transport is not used, or if the transport's port
is reachable only by trusted peers.

## Patches

Upgrade `@nestjs/microservices` to **12.0.3** or **11.2.5**.

Three changes landed together:

- **A stall timer drops a peer that stops sending mid-packet.** It is armed only while a
  packet is partially received and is refreshed on every read, so a slow but progressing
  transfer is never interrupted and a peer sitting idle between packets is left alone.
  Configurable as `incompleteMessageTimeout`, default 30000ms.
- **Reading is suspended while a peer's outgoing buffer is backed up** and resumes on
  `drain`, so a peer that stops reading cannot keep issuing requests.
- **Responses queued for a peer that reads nothing are capped.** Suspending reads is not
  sufficient on its own, because message handlers are asynchronous: a burst of pipelined
  requests is dispatched before the first response is written, and those responses still
  queue. Configurable as `maxSendBufferSize`, default 128MB.

Both limits are configurable on the server and on the client, and either can be disabled by
setting it to `0`.

### Behaviour change

Both limits are enabled by default, following the precedent set by `maxBufferSize`. A peer
that stops sending mid-packet for 30 seconds, or that lets more than 128MB of responses
queue unread on a single connection, is now disconnected where previously it was not.

The send cap can also drop a peer that is genuinely reading, if responses are produced
faster than the socket drains for long enough. The default is set high for that reason.
Applications that stream very large responses to deliberately slow consumers should raise
`maxSendBufferSize` or set it to `0`.

## Workarounds

For anyone who cannot upgrade immediately:

- **Restrict who can reach the port.** The TCP transport is designed for trusted
  service-to-service traffic. A network policy, security group, or L4 firewall that limits
  the port to known peers removes the exposure entirely, and is worth doing regardless of
  version.
- **Lower `maxBufferSize`.** This reduces what a single connection can pin on the receive
  side. It does not bound the total, because the limit is per connection and the number of
  connections is not capped, and it does nothing for the response-queueing path.
- **Supply a custom `socketClass`.** An application-provided socket class can implement its
  own idle timeout and backpressure handling. This is the only pre-patch mitigation that
  addresses the sending side.

Setting a process memory limit does not mitigate this. It converts the failure from an
out-of-memory kill of the host into an out-of-memory kill of the process.

## Credit

Reported by Salman Aljardan, who provided a detailed write-up and self-contained proofs of
concept for each issue, and coordinated disclosure.

## Affected packages

- `@nestjs/microservices < 11.2.5`
- `@nestjs/microservices >= 12.0.0, < 12.0.3`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `@nestjs/microservices 11.2.5`
- `@nestjs/microservices 12.0.3`