GHSA-89vp-jrxv-24w8Medium▾ SunlitJupyterLab: PyPI extension blocklist package-name canonicalization bypass
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 27.5 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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JupyterLab's PyPI extension manager enforces blocked_extensions_uris by comparing the requested install name to blocklist entries with a custom string normalization that is weaker than PyPI package-name canonicalization. An authenticated user can request a PyPI-equivalent spelling such as JupyterLab.Git for a blocklisted package such as jupyterlab-git; JupyterLab accepts the install request even though pip resolves the variant to the same package.
This has security implications only for deployments that combine all of the following:
The vulnerability lets an authenticated user install a package the operator specifically intended to block, defeating the allowlist/blocklist control. Because extensions in principle allow for arbitrary code execution, this vulnerability enables untrusted users to impact the integrity and availability of the jupyter-server instance that was provisioned to them. The user already has access to their own single-user server's data, so installing an extension grants no new read access.
In particular, the integrity of data can be impacted, and any hardening or restrictions on permitted user actions (download/upload limits) within the single-user server can be circumvented. Availability impact on a JupyterHub deployment is limited: while a user can be expected to exhaust their own kernel pod's resources, this vulnerability makes it easier to also exhaust the single-user server resources or generate more requests to shared resources; where limits are absent, resource exhaustion could potentially degrade the wider deployment.
JupyterLab v4.6.2 and v4.5.10 contain the patch.
Users of applications that depend on JupyterLab, such as Notebook v7+, should update jupyterlab package too.
No action is required for deployments that do not have a custom allow/block list configured. Deployments wanting to disable programmatic extension installation entirely can switch to the read-only extension manager:
--LabApp.extension_manager=readonly
or the following traitlet:
c.LabApp.extension_manager = 'readonly'
You can confirm that the read-only manager is in use from GUI:
<img width="293" height="293" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8016c809-633e-4ed0-a5bc-6bc4793caa0f" />jupyterlab >= 4.6.0, <= 4.6.1jupyterlab >= 4.5.0, <= 4.5.9Upgrade to a patched release:
jupyterlab 4.6.2jupyterlab 4.5.10Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
CVE-2026-73416Mediumjupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture
CVE-2026-73626High· 7.5JupyterLab versions >=4.6.0,<=4.6.1 and <=4.5.9 contain an allowlist/blocklist enforcement gap in PyPIExtensionManager.install()
CVE-2026-73417High· 8.3jupyterlab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture
GHSA-whvh-wf3x-g77jLowJupyterLab: Allowlist/blocklist check in `PyPIExtensionManager.install()` not enforced for direct callers (missing `await`)
GHSA-h5v5-8746-g7mmMediumJupyterLab PluginManager lock-rule enforcement bypass
GHSA-gx64-gj6p-pc4cHighJupyterLab: Image viewer allows XSS when opening malicious image in new browser tab