---
id: CVE-2026-98988
title: 'namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE'
summary: |-
  In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

  namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE

  open_tree(OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE) creates a new mount namespace from a
  copy of the tree at the given path. T…
severity: high
cvss: 8.8
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H'
cvssSource: cna
vendor: Linux
product: Linux
affected:
  - >-
    Linux >= 9b8a0ba68246a61d903ce62c35c303b1501df28b <
    b8a94a405ddcf45e9470789e0a821d8f2aa4ca10
  - >-
    Linux >= 9b8a0ba68246a61d903ce62c35c303b1501df28b <
    0febe278ec45b1ccdbe9bd5ff1ba365d8fd55e2a
  - Linux 7.0
published: '2026-10-23'
updated: '2026-10-24'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-24T14:09:51.817Z'
source: CVEORG
sourceUrl: 'https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-98988'
references:
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8a94a405ddcf45e9470789e0a821d8f2aa4ca10'
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0febe278ec45b1ccdbe9bd5ff1ba365d8fd55e2a'
tags:
  - cve.org
epss: 0.00198
epssPercentile: 0.09008
ingestedAt: '2026-10-23T13:24:55.546Z'
---

## Overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

namespace: keep covered mounts covered in OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE

open_tree(OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE) creates a new mount namespace from a
copy of the tree at the given path. The caller needs to be privileged
over its current user namespace because the new mount namespace will be
owned by it. It doesn't need to be privileged over the mount namespace
the tree is copied from. An unprivileged user just needs to create a
user namespace first.

The copy follows the rules of a detached bind mount. Without
AT_RECURSIVE only the mount itself is cloned and its children are left
out. With AT_RECURSIVE unbindable mounts are skipped. Both is fine when
the caller has privileges over the source mount namespace because it
could unmount those mounts anyway. Not so for an unprivileged user in
that mount namespace. For them a mount namespace copy is what unshare()
does. copy_mnt_ns() copies everything including unbindable mounts and
lock_mnt_tree() makes sure nothing can be unmounted in the copy. Nothing
that was covered gets revealed.

create_new_namespace() only does the locking and so the covered content
is right there in the new mount namespace:

  # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn; mkdir /tmp/otn/covered
  # echo hidden > /tmp/otn/covered/under.txt
  # mount -t tmpfs none /tmp/otn/covered

  uid 1000, after unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER):
  fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/otn", OPEN_TREE_NAMESPACE);
  setns(fd, CLONE_NEWNS);
  open("/covered/under.txt", O_RDONLY)  -> "hidden"

Covering paths with mounts is how container runtimes mask parts of
/proc and /sys and how admins hide things.

When the caller's user namespace doesn't own the source mount namespace
copy the way unshare() does and refuse a non-recursive copy of a mount
that has anything mounted below the requested directory and copy
unbindable mounts in a recursive copy. A caller that is privileged over
the source mount namespace sees no change.

## Affected

- `Linux >= 9b8a0ba68246a61d903ce62c35c303b1501df28b < b8a94a405ddcf45e9470789e0a821d8f2aa4ca10`
- `Linux >= 9b8a0ba68246a61d903ce62c35c303b1501df28b < 0febe278ec45b1ccdbe9bd5ff1ba365d8fd55e2a`
- `Linux 7.0`

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.