CVE-2026-98643None▾ SunlitIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops A sockops prog reading skops->rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a req…
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 2.8 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops
A sockops prog reading skops->rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.
SEC("sockops")
int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)
{
switch (skops->op) {
case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:
leak = skops->rtt_min; /* reads the request_sock OOB */
...
}
}
For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a leaked kernel pointer.
Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops->sk is not a locked full socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is the only one open-coded, so it skips the check.
Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special: it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset
offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)
(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get() returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset are no longer needed.
Before patch:
0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk
1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; ((tcp_sock *)sk)->rtt_min.s[0].v
After patch:
0: *(u64 *)(r1 +56) = r9
1: r9 = *(u8 *)(r1 +50) ; is_locked_tcp_sock
2: if r9 == 0 goto pc+4 ; not a locked full sock -> 0
3: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)
4: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk
5: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; rtt_min.s[0].v
6: goto pc+2
7: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)
8: r1 = 0
Linux >= 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 < 0c796efa919f52f788c22c79d1f1b70321696b3dLinux >= 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 < fc9d0e6e9d86fbefe7b8fe6ee49f4cf102add79dLinux >= 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 < fd6bf2721933d8c90bc4ce57f3e204c9295e7e3fLinux >= 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 < a8a9becbac93a9f54f4d565f1f3005eb08a7912fLinux >= 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 < 3a46f14e6cf375f3ca38f8f6e6524749e24ea0a8Linux >= 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 < 6785313d4fac96afb21ef193610c1fa88b1a9e64Linux >= 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 < cba54d142c43ec96d8c4d566f66439e8c0afded7Linux >= 44f0e43037d3a17b043843ba67610ac7c7e37db6 < 75f8cf22463d82bb1fb0239a3d485fc8f4c8ef03Linux 4.16Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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