---
id: CVE-2026-97437
title: |-
  In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

  ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()

  The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname->name_len (a
  character count) against e->size (a b…
summary: |-
  In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

  ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()

  The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname->name_len (a
  character count) against e->size (a b…
severity: high
cvss: 7.1
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H'
vendor: Linux
product: Linux
affected:
  - >-
    Linux >= 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <
    ed6da1abeec50db9060d714f03743fe0b63e4fe4
  - >-
    Linux >= 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <
    6a8149a20e46086c756c2a9202e377c0b649a0c3
  - >-
    Linux >= 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <
    aa1bdbb39f49c5bc9779316891c40005517842a5
  - Linux < 6.12.111
  - Linux < 6.18.53
  - Linux (all versions)
published: '2026-09-24'
updated: '2026-09-25'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-25T13:17:27.300'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97437'
references:
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a8149a20e46086c756c2a9202e377c0b649a0c3'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa1bdbb39f49c5bc9779316891c40005517842a5'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed6da1abeec50db9060d714f03743fe0b63e4fe4'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
tags:
  - nvd
  - cve.org
ingestedAt: '2026-09-24T16:47:15.879Z'
epss: 0.00138
epssPercentile: 0.02584
---

## Overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ntfs3: fix out-of-bounds read in ntfs_dir_emit() and hdr_find_e()

The bounds check in ntfs_dir_emit() compares fname->name_len (a
character count) against e->size (a byte count) without accounting
for the 2-byte-per-character UTF-16LE encoding or the ATTR_FILE_NAME
header size:

  if (fname->name_len + sizeof(struct NTFS_DE) > le16_to_cpu(e->size))

This computes: name_len + 16 > e_size

The correct check must account for the ATTR_FILE_NAME header (66 bytes
before the name) and the UTF-16LE character size (2 bytes each):

  sizeof(NTFS_DE) + offsetof(ATTR_FILE_NAME, name) +
  name_len * sizeof(short) > e_size

Which computes: 16 + 66 + name_len * 2 > e_size

The correct calculation already exists as fname_full_size() in ntfs.h
and is used in cmp_fnames(), namei.c, and fslog.c, but was not used
in the readdir path.

A crafted NTFS image with an index entry containing a small e->size
but large fname->name_len bypasses the current check, causing
ntfs_utf16_to_nls() to read past the entry boundary.

Additionally, add a key_size validation in hdr_find_e() to ensure the
declared key_size does not exceed the available entry data, preventing
comparison functions from reading past entry boundaries on the lookup
path.

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.