Zimbra Collaboration Suite OAuth Extension Cross-Site Request Forgery Enables Account Linking

Overview

A cross-site request forgery vulnerability in the OAuth extension of Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) Network Edition allows an attacker to link an attacker-controlled external account to a victim's mailbox. The OAuth callback does not bind its state value or authorization code to the initiating Zimbra session and instead selects the destination mailbox from the browser's current authentication cookie. On a deployment with the provider configured, an attacker can induce a signed-in victim to load a callback containing a fresh code for the attacker's provider account. This creates a persistent data source that imports attacker-controlled contacts or events. With bidirectional CalDAV synchronization, appointments subsequently created or edited in the linked calendar are also disclosed to the attacker. ZCS 10.1.16 and 10.1.20 are affected.

Affected

• collaboration_suite <= 10.1.20

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.