---
id: CVE-2026-92975
title: >-
  The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for
  WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and
  including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function
summary: >-
  The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for
  WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and
  including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function. This is due to the
  function iden…
severity: high
cvss: 8.1
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'
cwe:
  - CWE-269
published: '2026-10-10'
updated: '2026-10-10'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-10T06:16:44.253'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92975'
references:
  - url: 'https://github.com/groundhoggwp/groundhogg/commit/4b413aa6e'
    label: security@wordfence.com
  - url: >-
      https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L224
    label: security@wordfence.com
  - url: >-
      https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L238
    label: security@wordfence.com
  - url: >-
      https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L250
    label: security@wordfence.com
  - url: >-
      https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L298
    label: security@wordfence.com
  - url: >-
      https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/groundhogg/tags/4.8.1/admin/help/help-page.php#L599
    label: security@wordfence.com
  - url: >-
      https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c355658a-515a-48ed-a114-6a202e23e34b?source=cve
    label: security@wordfence.com
tags:
  - nvd
ingestedAt: '2026-10-10T06:24:42.872Z'
---

## Overview

The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function. This is due to the function identifying the support account solely by matching against publicly hardcoded constants — `user_login` `'groundhogg'` and email addresses `'support@groundhogg.io'` / `'help@groundhogg.io'` — where the `in_array()` email-equality check at line 238 is not a security boundary because any user fully controls their own email value. This makes it possible for an attacker with an account whose `user_login` is `'groundhogg'` and whose `user_email` matches one of the hardcoded support constants to have that account silently promoted to administrator — and additionally to super admin on multisite when the triggering administrator holds `manage_network_options` — resulting in full site takeover. Exploitation requires a two-actor flow: the attacker must first obtain or pre-plant an account with the hardcoded credentials (possible when open user registration is enabled or another account-creation path exists), after which a legitimate administrator must invoke the support-access feature via the `submit_ticket` or `process_send_support_access` entry points to trigger the promotion.

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.