---
id: CVE-2026-91085
title: "Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg).\_SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\_resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when …"
summary: "Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg).\_SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\_resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when …"
severity: none
cwe:
  - CWE-862
vendor: Apache Software Foundation
product: Apache Karaf
affected:
  - apache_karaf < 4.4.12
published: '2026-09-29'
updated: '2026-09-29'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-29T10:17:13.930'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91085'
references:
  - url: 'https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt'
    label: security@apache.org
  - url: 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10'
    label: af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
tags:
  - nvd
  - cve.org
ingestedAt: '2026-09-29T09:30:49.081Z'
---

## Overview

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.


The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role.




config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.




Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.




By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier.

MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.