---
id: CVE-2026-91012
title: >-
  org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid,
  properties),

  which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the
  file

  it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking tha…
summary: >-
  org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid,
  properties),

  which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the
  file

  it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking tha…
severity: none
vendor: Apache Software Foundation
product: org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl
affected:
  - org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl < 4.4.12
published: '2026-09-29'
updated: '2026-09-29'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-29T10:17:13.687'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91012'
references:
  - url: 'https://lists.apache.org/thread/op8trtz1qxkdwj2rjozhd9yt2yd6nhw4'
    label: security@apache.org
  - url: 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/8'
    label: af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
tags:
  - nvd
  - cve.org
ingestedAt: '2026-09-29T09:30:49.080Z'
---

## Overview

org.apache.karaf.config.core.impl.ConfigRepositoryImpl#update(pid, properties),
which backs the "config" MBean and the config:* shell commands, derives the file
it writes a configuration to from caller-supplied input without checking that
the result stays inside ${karaf.etc}:

  *  if the submitted property map contains a felix.fileinstall.filename entry, that value is turned directly into a File (getCfgFileFromProperty), so it can point to any absolute path the Karaf process can write to;
  *  otherwise the configuration PID is concatenated verbatim into the target file name (generateConfigFilename(): new File(karaf.etc, pid + ".cfg")), so a PID containing ".." segments resolves outside ${karaf.etc}. createFactoryConfiguration() has the same issue via the factory PID/alias.


Both code paths are reachable by any caller holding the "manager" role under Karaf's shipped command/JMX ACL (org.apache.karaf.command.acl.conf.cfg: "update = manager"). Such a user can therefore write attacker-controlled content to any file the Karaf process can write, including files the same ACL otherwise reserves to "admin" (etc/users.properties, etc/*.acl.*.cfg, etc/org.apache.karaf.management.cfg, and similar), allowing a manager-role user to grant themselves the admin role or otherwise take over the container.






ConfigMBeanImpl.install() and the config:install shell command already guarded the equivalent risk on their own code path with a finalname.contains("..") string check, but that check does not stop absolute paths or symlink-based escapes, and it was never applied to ConfigRepositoryImpl.update() / createFactoryConfiguration() at all.

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.