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CVE-2026-89864None▾ Sunlit

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Bound i2c->length in I2C bsg handlers struct qla_i2c_access carries a 16-bit length field alongside a fixed 64-byte buffer: struct qla_i2c_access { …

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Bound i2c->length in I2C bsg handlers struct qla_i2c_access carries a 16-bit length field alongside a fixed 64-byte buffer: struct qla_i2c_access { …

▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal

Depth score3/ 100 · Minimal

impact 2.8 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0

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Proof of concept

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Published

Sep 16, 2026

Updated

Sep 16, 2026

CVSS

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Vendor

Linux

Product

Linux

CWE

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Depth score

3 · Minimal

EPSS

0.21% · p12

Platforms

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Source

NVD

Vector

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EPSS history

Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Sep 19.

0.2% → 0.2%

Timeline

Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.

2 events · 3 days

Sep 16, 2026Published
Disclosed via NVD
Sep 19, 2026EPSS first tracked
0.2%

Linux #nvd #cve.org

Affected

Full technical detail▾

Overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Bound i2c->length in I2C bsg handlers

struct qla_i2c_access carries a 16-bit length field alongside a fixed 64-byte buffer:

struct qla_i2c_access {
	uint16_t device, offset, option, length;
	uint8_t  buffer[0x40];
} __packed;

qla2x00_write_i2c() and qla2x00_read_i2c() use the user-supplied i2c->length without any bounds check. i2c is overlaid on a 256-byte on-stack buffer and sfp is a 256-byte DMA-pool buffer, so a length up to 65535 overruns both:

write: memcpy(sfp, i2c->buffer, i2c->length) over-reads the stack and over-writes the sfp heap buffer, and qla2x00_write_sfp() then DMAs i2c->length bytes out of the 256-byte buffer.
read: qla2x00_read_sfp() DMAs i2c->length bytes into the 256-byte sfp, then memcpy(i2c->buffer, sfp, i2c->length) overflows the 64-byte buffer inside the on-stack array.

A caller holding CAP_SYS_RAWIO can use this to corrupt the heap and the kernel stack. Reject requests whose length exceeds the buffer before any copy or DMA transfer in both handlers.

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.

References

Related vulnerabilities

Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.

#nvd#cve.org