---
id: CVE-2026-85243
title: >-
  Apache Camel: Camel-Crypto-PGP Integrity Verification Downgrade via
  Attacker-Controlled Message Structure
summary: >-
  Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value vulnerability in Apache Camel
  Crypto PGP component.


  This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before
  4.22.1.


  unmarshal() verified the modification detection code…
severity: medium
cvss: 5.9
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N'
cvssSource: cna
cwe:
  - CWE-354
vendor: Apache Software Foundation
product: 'org.apache.camel:camel-crypto-pgp'
affected:
  - 'org.apache.camel:camel-crypto-pgp >= 4.0.0 < 4.18.5'
  - 'org.apache.camel:camel-crypto-pgp >= 4.19.0 < 4.22.1'
published: '2026-10-19'
updated: '2026-10-19'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-19T10:32:21.246Z'
source: CVEORG
sourceUrl: 'https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-85243'
references:
  - url: 'https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-85243.html'
    label: Apache Camel Security Advisory - CVE-2026-85243
  - url: 'https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24441'
    label: CAMEL-24441
  - url: 'https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25848'
    label: >-
      Fix on main, released in 4.23.0 (commit
      9d3108def6e8344f65a70ee86832b8f5237bc82d)
  - url: 'https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25944'
    label: >-
      Backport to camel-4.22.x, released in 4.22.1 (commit
      95b4c1500001bc32877df5b8fca0bc7bdd080666)
  - url: 'https://github.com/apache/camel/pull/25946'
    label: >-
      Backport to camel-4.18.x, released in 4.18.5 (commit
      4ec9b37d70b08c478966000fb1bd653abfe410e3)
tags:
  - cve.org
ingestedAt: '2026-10-19T12:27:23.816Z'
---

## Overview

Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value vulnerability in Apache Camel Crypto PGP component.

This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.

unmarshal() verified the modification detection code only when the message was an OpenPGP symmetrically encrypted integrity protected data packet. The older symmetrically encrypted data packet carries no such code, and OpenPGP's CFB mode is malleable without one, so a message using that packet skipped the check altogether. The packet type is chosen by whoever produced the message, which left the sender - or anyone able to rewrite the message in transit - deciding whether the integrity check applied at all. The existing integrity option governs marshalling only and had no decrypt-side counterpart, so a deployment could not require integrity protection on the messages it accepted.

Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. A requireIntegrityProtection option, defaulting to true, now rejects a message that is not integrity protected. Note that signatureVerificationOption still defaults to optional, so a message carrying no signature is accepted; the two options together are what give a decrypted message authenticity and not only confidentiality. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, reject messages that do not use the integrity protected packet before they reach the data format. Routes that must interoperate with a sender still emitting the legacy packet should set requireIntegrityProtection=false after upgrading, and treat the decrypted content as unauthenticated.

## Affected

- `org.apache.camel:camel-crypto-pgp >= 4.0.0 < 4.18.5`
- `org.apache.camel:camel-crypto-pgp >= 4.19.0 < 4.22.1`

## Remediation

Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. A requireIntegrityProtection option, defaulting to true, now rejects a message that is not integrity protected. Note that signatureVerificationOption still defaults to optional, so a message carrying no signature is accepted; the two options together are what give a decrypted message authenticity and not only confidentiality.

### Workarounds

For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, reject messages that do not use the integrity protected packet before they reach the data format. Routes that must interoperate with a sender still emitting the legacy packet should set requireIntegrityProtection=false after upgrading, and treat the decrypted content as unauthenticated.