CVE-2026-84747None▾ SunlitInterpretation conflict in the HTTP protocol implementation in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to bypass access control rules enforced by a front proxy. Root Cause: The method dispatch function Fi…
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 2.8 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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Interpretation conflict in the HTTP protocol implementation in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to bypass access control rules enforced by a front proxy.
Root Cause: The method dispatch function FindMethodPropertyByURI() in bRPC's HTTP protocol splits the request path with a string splitter that skips empty fields, so paths containing empty path segments (consecutive slashes), such as //flags, /flags// and /flags//port, are dispatched to the same method as their collapsed form /flags. Per RFC 3986 these are distinct paths. A front proxy that enforces an ACL (e.g. blocking access to builtin services such as /flags) matches the collapsed form only, and therefore forwards the padded literal to the bRPC server, where it is dispatched as if it were the collapsed form. This differential allows //flags?setvalue= to reach a builtin service that /flags is not allowed to reach. Additionally, the HTTP/2 implementation never validated the :path pseudo-header, so requests without a :path, or with a :path that neither begins with '/' nor is the asterisk-form '*', contrary to RFC 9113 section 8.3.1, were not rejected.
Affected Scenarios: Deployments of Apache bRPC behind a front proxy or gateway that performs access control (ACL) decisions on the literal request path, where the bRPC server accepts HTTP or HTTP/2 traffic from that proxy. In such deployments an attacker can send a path containing empty path segments to reach a resource that the front proxy intended to block.
How to Fix: (Choose one of the following options)
Note: After applying the fix, HTTP and HTTP/2 request paths containing empty path segments (consecutive slashes) are rejected by default, and HTTP/2 :path values that are empty or neither begin with '/' nor equal '*' are rejected. Deployments that depend on the previous lenient behavior can restore it by turning on the gflag -http_allow_empty_path_segments, which is not recommended for servers exposed to untrusted traffic.
apache/brpc < 1.18.0Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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