---
id: CVE-2026-81730
title: >-
  Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 Path Traversal via EmailCollector Attachment
  Filename
summary: >-
  Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name
  supplied in the message's MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename.
  The global saveAttachment() in
  htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php b…
severity: high
cvss: 8.2
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L'
cvssSource: cna
cwe:
  - CWE-22
vendor: Dolibarr
product: dolibarr
affected:
  - dolibarr >= 9.0.0 < 24.0.0
ssvc:
  exploitation: none
  automatable: 'yes'
  technicalImpact: partial
  timestamp: '2026-08-28T17:54:28.936858Z'
published: '2026-08-27'
updated: '2026-09-24'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-24T14:19:50.025Z'
source: CVEORG
sourceUrl: 'https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-81730'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/264a44defb5e438689c75679617f6edc4c038abc
    label: Patch Commit
  - url: 'https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr'
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/blob/23.0.4/htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php#L187
  - url: >-
      https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dolibarr-9.0.0-through-23.0.4-path-traversal-via-emailcollector-attachment-filename
    label: >-
      VulnCheck Advisory: Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 Path Traversal via
      EmailCollector Attachment Filename
tags:
  - cve.org
epss: 0.00561
epssPercentile: 0.44342
ingestedAt: '2026-09-24T15:45:56.696Z'
---

## Overview

Dolibarr 9.0.0 through 23.0.4 saves inbound email attachments under the name supplied in the message's MIME headers without reducing it to a safe basename. The global saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/lib/emailcollector.lib.php builds $filepath = $path . $filename . '.' . $ext and hands it to file_put_contents(), and the private saveAttachment() in htdocs/emailcollector/class/emailcollector.class.php writes to $destdir.'/'.$filename; the name reaches both from the attachment's own getName() or getFilename() value by way of the record-join, create-ticket and create-project operations. A traversal sequence in the filename therefore survives intact, so any sender who can email a mailbox that an EmailCollector monitors, which is the module's ordinary use for a support or ticket inbox, can place attacker-controlled content outside the per-object attachment directory without holding a Dolibarr account. Under the hardened layout Dolibarr's SECURITY.md requires, with htdocs read-only, the write is confined to the documents tree and corrupts or forges other objects' documents; where htdocs is writable the same primitive reaches a web-executable path. Version 24.0.0 applies dol_sanitizePathName() and dol_sanitizeFileName() before the write.

## Affected

- `dolibarr >= 9.0.0 < 24.0.0`

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.