---
id: CVE-2026-81568
title: >-
  Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in
  J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 -
  `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a
  purchased digital download by concate…
summary: >-
  Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in
  J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 -
  `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a
  purchased digital download by concate…
severity: high
cvss: 8.7
cvssVector: 'CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N'
cwe:
  - CWE-22
vendor: j2commerce.com
product: J2Store extension for Joomla
affected:
  - j2store_extension_for_joomla 1.0.0-3.3.22
  - j2store_extension_for_joomla 4.0.0-4.0.22
  - j2store_extension_for_joomla 4.1.0-4.1.7
published: '2026-09-15'
updated: '2026-09-16'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-16T19:28:06.713'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81568'
references:
  - url: 'https://www.j2commerce.com/'
    label: security@joomla.org
tags:
  - nvd
  - cve.org
ssvc:
  exploitation: none
  automatable: 'yes'
  technicalImpact: partial
  timestamp: '2026-09-15T19:29:28.406527Z'
cvssSource: cna
ingestedAt: '2026-09-15T19:42:58.808Z'
epss: 0.00496
epssPercentile: 0.40089
---

## Overview

Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file's stored `product_file_save_name`, using only `JPath::clean()` (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject `..` segments) and a plain `JFile::exists()` check — never confirming the resolved path stayed inside the configured attachment folder. If a product file's `product_file_save_name` ever contained a `../` traversal segment — most plausibly via the CSRF-forgeable admin product-file save actions described in Issue 1, but equally by any future integration or bug that writes that field — any customer holding a valid download `token`/`pid` pair for that product file could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. `configuration.php`).

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.