CVE-2026-79978Low· 3.6▾ SunlitThe RTIO streaming completion callback adxl345_process_fifo_samples_cb() in drivers/sensor/adi/adxl345/adxl345_stream.c clamps the amount of FIFO data it will report (read_len = MIN(fifo_bytes, buf_avail)) to the space actually returned …
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 19.8 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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The RTIO streaming completion callback adxl345_process_fifo_samples_cb() in drivers/sensor/adi/adxl345/adxl345_stream.c clamps the amount of FIFO data it will report (read_len = MIN(fifo_bytes, buf_avail)) to the space actually returned by rtio_sqe_rx_buf(), but then queues one 6-byte bus read per hardware FIFO entry at consecutive offsets from read_buf, bounded by the device-reported entry count rather than by the clamp. When the allocated buffer is smaller than a full batch, the driver writes up to 186 bytes past the end of the allocation; a companion defect left data->fifo_total_bytes un-reset at batch start, so an aborted or errored chain could leave a stale write offset that pushes the next batch's writes out of bounds as well.
A short buffer is an expected, first-class outcome of the RTIO allocator: rtio_block_pool_alloc() walks the requested size down one block at a time until a contiguous run is available, and the driver only demands sizeof(struct adxl345_fifo_data) + 6 bytes as its minimum. Any streaming configuration whose mempool block granularity is smaller than a full FIFO batch (204 bytes) — for example the sensor shell's RTIO_DEFINE_WITH_MEMPOOL(sensor_read_rtio, 8, 8, 32, 64, 4) used by sensor stream <dev> on fifo_wm incl, or the 16-byte-block streaming example in the documentation — takes this path whenever the pool is fragmented or the consuming thread falls behind.
The out-of-bounds writes are performed by the I2C/SPI RTIO backend (DMA on many SoCs) into the shared RTIO block pool, corrupting neighbouring live buffers or, for a pool smaller than one batch, memory beyond the pool itself. The written bytes are accelerometer samples and the destination follows the allocation, so there is no controllable corruption primitive: the realistic impact is silent corruption of other RTIO consumers' data or a crash. Reaching it requires a board with an interrupt-wired ADXL345 built with CONFIG_ADXL345_STREAM, plus buffer-pool starvation, which a co-resident local workload can induce but which also occurs spontaneously under load; there is no network, USB or radio path to this code.
zephyr >= 4.0.0 <= 4.4.2Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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