CVE-2026-79666Medium· 6.5▾ SunlitEch0: Missing authorization on dashboard log endpoints allows low-privilege users to access sensitive system logs
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 35.8 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Aug 27.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via OSV
Last analysed / modified upstream
0.3%
Ech0 allows any authenticated user to read historical system logs and subscribe to live log streams because the dashboard log endpoints validate only that a JWT is present and valid, but do not require an administrator role or privileged scope.
Any valid user session can access GET /api/system/logs and can also connect to the SSE and WebSocket log streaming endpoints. This exposes operational log data to low-privilege users. Depending on deployment and logging practices, the returned logs may include internal file paths, stack traces, admin activity, background job output, internal URLs, and other sensitive operational context. This creates a post-authentication information disclosure primitive that can materially aid follow-on attacks.
The issue is caused by an authorization gap between route registration, handler logic, and the service layer.
internal/router/dashboard.go registers the log endpoints on authenticated router groups, but does not apply any admin-only authorization middleware:
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
// Auth
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs/stream", h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())
}
internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go returns log data directly and the SSE/WS handlers only check whether jwtUtil.ParseToken(token) succeeds:
func (dashboardHandler *DashboardHandler) GetSystemLogs() gin.HandlerFunc {
return res.Execute(func(ctx *gin.Context) res.Response {
logs, err := dashboardHandler.dashboardService.GetSystemLogs(service.SystemLogQuery{
Tail: tail,
Level: ctx.Query("level"),
Keyword: ctx.Query("keyword"),
})
if err != nil {
return res.Response{Err: err}
}
return res.Response{
Data: logs,
Msg: "获取系统日志成功",
}
})
}
internal/service/dashboard/dashboard.go exposes the log backend without adding a compensating admin check:
func (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {
tail := query.Tail
if tail <= 0 {
tail = 200
}
return logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)
}
Affected endpoints:
GET /api/system/logsGET /api/system/logs/stream?token=...GET /ws/system/logs?token=...docker run -d \
--name ech0 \
-p 6277:6277 \
-v /opt/ech0/data:/app/data \
-e JWT_SECRET="Hello Echos" \
sn0wl1n/ech0:latest
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/init/owner" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"owner","password":"ownerpass","email":"[email protected]"}'
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/register" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"winky","password":"winkypass","email":"[email protected]"}'
winky_token=$(
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/login" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"winky","password":"winkypass"}' \
| sed -n 's/.*"data":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p'
)
curl -sS "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/system/logs" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $winky_token"
Observed response: the non-admin user receives 200 OK and a JSON response containing entries from app.log
The same missing-authorization pattern also affects:
GET /api/system/logs/stream?token=<non-admin-token>GET /ws/system/logs?token=<non-admin-token>Require an explicit admin-only scope on all dashboard log routes and enforce the same requirement in the service layer.
Suggested change in internal/router/dashboard.go:
import (
"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/handler"
"github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/middleware"
authModel "github.com/lin-snow/ech0/internal/model/auth"
)
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
"/system/logs",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs(),
)
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET(
"/system/logs/stream",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs(),
)
appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET(
"/system/logs",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs(),
)
}
Suggested defense-in-depth change in the service layer:
func (s *DashboardService) GetSystemLogs(ctx context.Context, query SystemLogQuery) ([]logUtil.LogEntry, error) {
if err := s.ensureAdmin(ctx); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tail := query.Tail
if tail <= 0 {
tail = 200
}
return logUtil.QueryLogFileTail(logUtil.CurrentLogFilePath(), tail, query.Level, query.Keyword)
}
github.com/lin-snow/ech0 < 4.3.5Upgrade to a patched release:
github.com/lin-snow/ech0 4.3.5Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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