CVE-2026-78384None▾ SunlitCompressionUtils.inflate() decompressed attacker-controlled DEFLATE data with no output-size cap. A small (~KB) crafted payload could expand to gigabytes on the heap. Reachable via JWE decryption when zip=DEF (e.g. JoseSessionTokenProvid…
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 2.8 · likelihood 0 · exploitation 0
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CompressionUtils.inflate() decompressed attacker-controlled DEFLATE data with no output-size cap. A small (~KB) crafted payload could expand to gigabytes on the heap. Reachable via JWE decryption when zip=DEF (e.g. JoseSessionTokenProvider with RSA-OAEP key wrap) and via SAML redirect/POST binding token inflation — in both cases decompression happens before/independent of trust validation.
Fix: Added a configurable maximum inflated-size cap (default 10 MiB, org.apache.cxf.compression-max-inflated-size system property) to CompressionUtils.inflate(); aborts with DataFormatException once exceeded. Users are recommended to upgrade to versions 4.2.4 or 4.1.9 or 3.6.13, which fix this issue.
Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.