---
id: CVE-2026-77814
title: >-
  is_path_trusted in scripts/iib/api.py compares the requested path against each
  allowed parent directory with path.startswith(parent_path), without appending
  a path separator
summary: >-
  is_path_trusted in scripts/iib/api.py compares the requested path against each
  allowed parent directory with path.startswith(parent_path), without appending
  a path separator. A directory whose name merely begins with an allowed path
  ther…
severity: high
cvss: 7.5
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N'
cwe:
  - CWE-22
vendor: zanllp
product: infinite-image-browsing
affected:
  - infinite-image-browsing <= 1.8.0
published: '2026-08-21'
updated: '2026-09-24'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-24T20:06:30.133'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77814'
references:
  - url: 'https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing'
    label: disclosure@vulncheck.com
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/blob/v1.8.0/scripts/iib/api.py#L329-L344
    label: disclosure@vulncheck.com
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/commit/4057a624c7a23a36f0b4dc6a545b40767d602450
    label: disclosure@vulncheck.com
  - url: 'https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/issues/968'
    label: disclosure@vulncheck.com
  - url: 'https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/pull/969'
    label: disclosure@vulncheck.com
  - url: >-
      https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/infinite-image-browsing-is-path-trusted-prefix-comparison-omits-the-trailing-path-separator
    label: disclosure@vulncheck.com
  - url: 'https://github.com/zanllp/infinite-image-browsing/issues/968'
    label: 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
tags:
  - nvd
  - cve.org
  - exploit-available
epss: 0.00504
epssPercentile: 0.40521
exploitAvailable: true
ssvc:
  exploitation: poc
  automatable: 'yes'
  technicalImpact: partial
  timestamp: '2026-08-21T17:33:19.983444Z'
ingestedAt: '2026-09-24T15:45:56.698Z'
---

## Overview

is_path_trusted in scripts/iib/api.py compares the requested path against each allowed parent directory with path.startswith(parent_path), without appending a path separator. A directory whose name merely begins with an allowed path therefore satisfies the comparison, so where /data/images is allowed a request for /data/images_private/secret.txt is treated as trusted and served by FileResponse, disclosing files the confinement was meant to exclude. Whether the check applies depends on get_enable_access_control in scripts/iib/tool.py: it returns true when IIB_ACCESS_CONTROL is set to enable, false when set to disable, and otherwise true when the host Stable Diffusion WebUI was started with share, ngrok, listen or server_name, falling back to false. Confinement is therefore active in the network-exposed WebUI deployments that rely on it, while a standalone run with no such option serves every readable file regardless of this flaw. The fix compares against parent_path joined with os.sep.

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.