---
id: CVE-2026-74671
title: "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()\n\nThe digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:\n\n\tif (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start …"
summary: "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()\n\nThe digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:\n\n\tif (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start …"
severity: none
published: '2026-08-22'
updated: '2026-10-14'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-14T13:10:00.187'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74671'
references:
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27f3924061592d0ef6b04e16f48754b6cb6adf27'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ff232d31106f45ac87c3b64e1d35a0667777797'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e515b6c9aab452a4f0734bd7208e4e780e164ca'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a784b4732ac7e51862b9b210c2d8b2ab9e83568c'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6cb134707a2127d90a58d69dd818679cae8033c'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/caeb105c15ea2431fa8da7ecfa242d0c68272426'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d823b5f4557083d1dd92096f796a78a2b1b06d10'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd04114af0d451091f7b8cbd26d9e37d011e9131'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
tags:
  - nvd
epss: 0.00177
epssPercentile: 0.06723
ingestedAt: '2026-10-14T13:30:58.533Z'
---

## Overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()

The digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:

	if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
			iint->ima_hash->length)

sizeof() yields size_t, so the usual arithmetic conversions promote
the whole left-hand side to unsigned 64-bit before the subtraction
runs. For a truncated xattr this underflows instead of going negative:
a 1-byte IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG xattr (xattr_len == 1, hash_start == 1)
turns "1 - 1 - 1" into SIZE_MAX, which is trivially >= ima_hash->length.
The check then passes and the following memcmp() reads
iint->ima_hash->length bytes starting past the end of the buffer
vfs_getxattr_alloc() allocated for it.

Nothing upstream clamps xattr_len back into a safe range first:
ima_get_hash_algo() only special-cases xattr_len < 2 to pick a default
algorithm, and evm_verifyxattr() returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN rather than
failing when no HMAC key is loaded, so a truncated security.ima value
reaches the length check as-is.

Rewrite the comparison so every operand stays a signed int and no
implicit conversion to size_t can occur.

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.