---
id: CVE-2026-74635
title: "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor()\n\nbit_cursor() fetches the glyph under the cursor with\n\n\tc = scr_readw(vc_pos);\n\tsrc = vc_font.data + ((c & charm…"
summary: "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor()\n\nbit_cursor() fetches the glyph under the cursor with\n\n\tc = scr_readw(vc_pos);\n\tsrc = vc_font.data + ((c & charm…"
severity: high
cvss: 7.8
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'
published: '2026-08-22'
updated: '2026-10-14'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-14T13:10:00.187'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74635'
references:
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/250159ace2dc53c1bdad267aa8da51b638748700'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46336f476484f36145e5117e72d7b590f47433ee'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94134d70abf9273b70499d97d0adc9185ef21091'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ea879862e66e354e616028c31b39aa3eb6d35d8'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc9db0d879c655d5dfd8add32fd60f13e65d132c'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf750cfeacf4e47ac72dadc7f05839696efb8576'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1e7351767dd30fc574395c82121e4c67b882da3'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e033cbf3975a8465f879ebd5989dc35b04423a4d'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
tags:
  - nvd
epss: 0.00129
epssPercentile: 0.02242
ingestedAt: '2026-10-14T13:30:58.522Z'
---

## Overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor()

bit_cursor() fetches the glyph under the cursor with

	c = scr_readw(vc_pos);
	src = vc_font.data + ((c & charmask) * w * height);

where charmask is 0x1ff when vc_hi_font_mask is set. The screen buffer
value comes directly from scr_readw() and may be larger than the current
font's glyph count.

Syzkaller triggers this via vcs_write(). The Call Trace shows
vcs_write() in vc_screen.c writing an arbitrary 16-bit value with
writev() to /dev/vcsa, which vcs_write_buf() in vc_screen.c stores via
vcs_scr_writew() without checking charcount. The stored value is later
read in bit_cursor() in bitblit.c.

When the font is changed from a font with 512 glyphs to a font with
256 glyphs, the screen buffer can retain characters with the high
bit set from the previous mode, which could also produce the same
out-of-bounds access.

  BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70
  Read of size 16 at addr ffff800086c57970

  Call Trace:
   soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70
   bit_cursor+0xa90/0x1108 drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c:365
   fbcon_cursor+0x344/0x498 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:1427
   hide_cursor+0xdc/0x2d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:883
   update_region+0x100/0x18c drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:669
   vcs_write+0x8ec/0xaf0 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:685

bit_putcs_aligned() and bit_putcs_unaligned() already clamp the glyph
index to vc_font.charcount. Apply the same clamp in bit_cursor() after
extracting the attribute and masking, before indexing fontdata.

The fix completes the bounds checking started in commit 18c4ef4e765a
("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*"), which missed
the cursor path.

This change should be safe because the clamp reuses the existing
contract from fbcon: charcount is maintained under console_lock in
con_font_set() and fbcon_font_set(), and hi_font_mask is cleared when
switching from 512 to 256 glyphs. When stale screen data with high bits
remains after a font switch, or when vcs_write() stores an arbitrary
value, clamping the index to 0 prevents the out-of-bounds read without
changing cursor semantics — the same fallback bit_putcs uses.

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.