In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: skip global block reserve accounting for rescue mounts [BUG] Mounting with rescue=ibadroots after corrupting the block group tree root triggers a NULL pointer d…

Overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: skip global block reserve accounting for rescue mounts

[BUG] Mounting with rescue=ibadroots after corrupting the block group tree root triggers a NULL pointer dereference:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000100 RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_global_block_rsv+0x9d/0x1c0 [btrfs] Call Trace: fill_dummy_bgs+0xd4/0x120 [btrfs] open_ctree+0xc6e/0x1ca0 [btrfs] btrfs_get_tree+0x50d/0xa40 [btrfs]

The same crash occurs with a corrupted raid stripe tree root, via btrfs_read_block_groups() instead of fill_dummy_bgs().

[CAUSE] With rescue=ibadroots, btrfs_read_roots() allows the mount to continue when either root cannot be read, leaving the corresponding root pointer NULL while its on-disk feature bit remains set.

btrfs_update_global_block_rsv() then dereferences the missing root based on the feature bit alone.

[FIX] Rescue mounts are fully read-only and cannot start transactions, so the global reserve is never consumed. Under btrfs_is_full_ro(), mark the reserve as full and return before performing the accounting.

And since we need to check if the fs is mount fully RO, export fs_is_full_ro() as btrfs_is_full_ro(), and move it to fs.h.

[ Squash the fs_is_full_ro() export commit into this one. ]

Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.