---
id: CVE-2026-72343
title: 'net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation'
summary: |-
  In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

  net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation

  mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),
  before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv->stat…
severity: high
cvss: 8.4
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'
cvssSource: cna
vendor: Linux
product: Linux
affected:
  - >-
    Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 <
    3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50
  - >-
    Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 <
    5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01
  - >-
    Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 <
    22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf
  - >-
    Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 <
    420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4
  - >-
    Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 <
    abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2
  - >-
    Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 <
    25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17
  - Linux 5.17
ssvc:
  exploitation: none
  automatable: 'no'
  technicalImpact: total
  timestamp: '2026-10-16T18:47:27.911356Z'
published: '2026-08-15'
updated: '2026-10-16'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-16T18:55:19.281Z'
source: CVEORG
sourceUrl: 'https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-72343'
references:
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50'
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01'
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf'
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4'
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2'
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17'
tags:
  - cve.org
epss: 0.00196
epssPercentile: 0.08643
ingestedAt: '2026-10-16T19:46:24.406Z'
---

## Overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Fix HV VHCA stats zero-sized buffer allocation

mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() is called from mlx5e_nic_enable(),
before mlx5e_open(). At that point priv->stats_nch is still zero,
because it is only ever incremented in mlx5e_channel_stats_alloc(),
which is reached only from mlx5e_open_channel().

mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() therefore returns 0, and
kvzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL) returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR ((void *)16) rather
than NULL. The "if (!buf)" guard does not catch this, and
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() completes "successfully" with
priv->stats_agent.buf set to ZERO_SIZE_PTR.

Once channels are opened (priv->stats_nch > 0) and the hypervisor
enables stats reporting, mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_work() recomputes
buf_len using the new non-zero stats_nch and calls
memset(buf, 0, buf_len) on ZERO_SIZE_PTR, faulting at address 0x10.

Allocate the buffer based on priv->max_nch, which is set in
mlx5e_priv_init() and is the upper bound on stats_nch:

  - Add a separate helper mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_max_size() that
    returns sizeof(per_ring_stats) * max(max_nch, stats_nch), and
    use it for the kvzalloc() in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create().
  - Keep mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_buf_size() (which returns based on
    stats_nch) for the worker's active payload size, so the wire
    format (block->rings = stats_nch) and the amount of data filled
    by mlx5e_hv_vhca_fill_stats() are unchanged.

The max(max_nch, stats_nch) guard handles the rare case where
mlx5e_attach_netdev() recomputes max_nch downward across a
detach/resume cycle while priv->stats_nch persists (mlx5e_detach_netdev
does not call mlx5e_priv_cleanup, so stats_nch is only reset when
the netdev is destroyed). Without the guard, the worker could compute
buf_len from stats_nch and overrun the smaller buffer allocated based
on the reduced max_nch.

Allocating a non-zero buffer also makes the kvzalloc() failure path in
mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_create() reachable for the first time: it returns
early without (re)creating the agent. Clear
priv->stats_agent.{agent,buf} in mlx5e_hv_vhca_stats_destroy() after
freeing them, so that if a later create() bails out on this path, a
subsequent teardown does not double-free the stale agent/buffer left
from a previous enable/disable cycle.

This mirrors the existing mlx5e pattern of preallocating arrays of
size max_nch (e.g. priv->channel_stats) and lazily populating
entries up to stats_nch on demand.

## Affected

- `Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 < 3b3a552cf88e10bb7bda88b29cf1fd8267043d50`
- `Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 < 5b927dcec5f1087942bf123a82e64a3f66475f01`
- `Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 < 22c1d5ecccf92c849bdca1556179aafc95794baf`
- `Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 < 420aabb32da4381d8d7cdcaa6a77fad9eaceb0a4`
- `Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 < abc4c56427f144c96b2827a4db3b90eb5b7349a2`
- `Linux >= fa691d0c9c0812b9045f3a9420862e47b3b92518 < 25f6b929c7e379cbea7cb8caa67b49b2d1efae17`
- `Linux 5.17`

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.