---
id: CVE-2026-67424
aliases:
  - GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc
title: >-
  Flyto2 Core: Guarded HTTP modules follow redirects into internal space without
  per-hop SSRF revalidation
summary: >-
  Flyto2 Core: Guarded HTTP modules follow redirects into internal space without
  per-hop SSRF revalidation
severity: high
cvss: 8.5
cwe:
  - CWE-918
vendor: flyto-core
product: flyto-core
ecosystem: pip
affected:
  - flyto-core <= 2.26.6
patched:
  - flyto-core 2.26.7
published: '2026-07-30'
updated: '2026-07-30'
source: GHSA
sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc
  - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67424'
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/commit/0a0a528520ec18f5a21f1ddf858a71cc1edfb6e9
  - url: 'https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/releases/tag/v2.26.7'
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c9hr-64h3-gxpc'
tags:
  - ghsa
  - pip
epss: 0.00412
epssPercentile: 0.3261
ingestedAt: '2026-07-30T14:54:20.059Z'
---

## Overview

## Summary
The HTTP modules that DO call the SSRF guard (`http.get`, `http.request`, `http.batch`) validate only the initial URL, then issue the request with aiohttp's default `allow_redirects=True` and perform no per-hop revalidation. An attacker hosts a public URL that 302-redirects to an internal address; the guard passes on the public host and aiohttp transparently follows the redirect into internal space, returning the internal body.

## Root Cause
`src/core/modules/atomic/http/get.py:116` calls `session.get(url, ...)` with no `allow_redirects` argument → aiohttp default `True`. `request.py:60` sets `allow_redirects=follow_redirects` (default True at :327); `batch.py:57` likewise. A repo grep of `http/` for `on_request_redirect` / `response.history` returns NONE — there is no redirect interception or Location revalidation.

## Impact
Full readable SSRF that defeats the primary SSRF control on the very modules that correctly validate. Confidentiality of internal/metadata responses (C:H), S:C.

## Proof of Concept
Verified live: `http.get` with allowlisted base `127.0.0.1` followed a `302 Location: http://127.0.0.2/...` (non-allowlisted) and returned `INTERNAL-VIA-REDIRECT`.
```
attacker hosts http://attacker.tld/r  ->  302 Location: http://<cloud-metadata-ip>/latest/meta-data/...
execute_module http.get {"url":"http://attacker.tld/r"}
```

## Attack Chain
1. Entry: `execute_module http.get {url:"http://attacker.tld/r"}` (attacker 302->internal). Guard: `validate_url_with_env_config(url)` (get.py:104). Bypass proof: validation runs on `attacker.tld` (public) → passes; never re-run on the redirect target.
2. Sink: `session.get(url)` (get.py:116) — no `allow_redirects` arg → aiohttp default True. Bypass proof: grep of `http/` for `on_request_redirect`/`response.history` → NONE.
3. Impact: aiohttp follows 302 to the internal host; internal body returned (get.py:118).

## Bypass Evidence
Live PoC followed a 302 into non-allowlisted loopback and returned the internal marker string. aiohttp `ClientSession.get` default `allow_redirects=True`; module never sets it False; no per-hop revalidation exists.

## Affected Versions
`<= 2.26.6` — `get.py:116`, `request.py:60`, `batch.py:57` present on latest release tag.

## Suggested Fix
Set `allow_redirects=False` and manually revalidate each `Location` header through `validate_url_with_env_config` before following, or cap and re-check every hop.

## Credit

Vulnerability discovered by zx (Jace).

## Affected packages

- `flyto-core <= 2.26.6`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `flyto-core 2.26.7`