---
id: CVE-2026-64361
title: |-
  In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

  hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length

  check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against
  node_size using u32 arithmetic
summary: |-
  In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

  hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length

  check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against
  node_size using u32 arithmetic.  …
severity: high
cvss: 7.8
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'
published: '2026-07-25'
updated: '2026-07-27'
source: NVD
sourceUrl: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64361'
references:
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/607217f7ad419b53926f71e3f75001813bbc08ad'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/671c3fcc2ad31c1311ea6414382a2d95104ae1b9'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7399c3baee7bb622a92f0b895cd4d3009a693f2b'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/966cb76fb2857a4242cab6ea2ea17acf818a3da7'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b6a481642ea1977be2f84dc08c5affd742c177e7'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c25d3c931a63e762fcaa9cb125b901c53b62403f'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8dd112173c02adf539fe2ad34a45f5e0068780d'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
  - url: 'https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc9d1447ca3cdc78d2e4ace1ce1f3a7c77ca08b1'
    label: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
tags:
  - nvd
epss: 0.00129
epssPercentile: 0.02103
ingestedAt: '2026-07-27T06:16:50.708Z'
---

## Overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length

check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against
node_size using u32 arithmetic.  When the caller passes a large len
value (e.g. from an underflowed subtraction in hfs_brec_remove()),
off + len can wrap past 2^32 and produce a small result, causing the
bounds check to pass when it should fail.

For example, with off=14 and len=0xFFFFFFF2 (underflowed from
data_off - keyoffset - size in hfs_brec_remove), off + len wraps to 6,
which is less than a typical node_size of 512, so the check passes and
the subsequent memmove reads ~4GB past the node buffer.

Fix this by widening the addition to u64 before comparing against
node_size.  This prevents the u32 wrap while keeping the logic
straightforward.

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.