--- id: CVE-2026-59217 aliases: - GHSA-7r7x-gjvr-448g title: >- Open WebUI: Upload `metadata.knowledge_id` bypasses the knowledge-base write-access check (read-only users can add files to KB) summary: >- Open WebUI: Upload `metadata.knowledge_id` bypasses the knowledge-base write-access check (read-only users can add files to KB) severity: medium cvss: 4.3 cwe: - CWE-862 - CWE-863 vendor: open-webui product: open-webui ecosystem: pip affected: - open-webui < 0.10.0 patched: - open-webui 0.10.0 published: '2026-07-24' updated: '2026-07-24' source: GHSA sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7r7x-gjvr-448g' references: - url: >- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-7r7x-gjvr-448g - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59217' - url: 'https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26001' - url: >- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/b7626f05fb92b24ab923ad81a037071ebd5623d1 - url: 'https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0' - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7r7x-gjvr-448g' tags: - ghsa - pip epss: 0.00372 epssPercentile: 0.28315 ingestedAt: '2026-07-24T17:34:27.221Z' --- ## Overview # Open WebUI upload metadata can add files to knowledge bases without write permission ## Summary Open WebUI's file upload background processing trusts the client-supplied `metadata.knowledge_id` value and inserts a `knowledge_file` association before validating that the uploading user has write access to the target knowledge base. A verified user with only read access to a knowledge base can upload an arbitrary file and set `metadata={"knowledge_id":""}`. The normal `/api/v1/knowledge/{id}/file/add` endpoint correctly requires knowledge-base write access, but the upload auto-link path bypasses that authorization check. The immediate result is unauthorized modification of the target knowledge base's file membership. The attached attacker-controlled file becomes visible through `/api/v1/knowledge/{id}/files`, and readers/owners of that knowledge base can retrieve the file through the normal file endpoints because file access is derived from `KnowledgeFile` membership. ## Affected Version - Repository: `open-webui/open-webui` - Tested source commit: `02dc3e689ceac915a870b373318b99c029ddf603` - Package version observed in `package.json`: `0.9.6` - Package name: `open-webui` ## Impact A read-only knowledge-base collaborator can perform a write operation against that knowledge base by attaching arbitrary uploaded files. Security impact: - Unauthorized knowledge-base membership modification. - Integrity impact on shared knowledge-base file listings. - Attacker-controlled files become readable to other users who can read the target knowledge base. - If an owner/admin later reprocesses or globally reindexes the knowledge base, the unauthorized file can be indexed into the knowledge collection, turning the membership bypass into RAG/content poisoning. This is not an unauthenticated issue. It requires a verified Open WebUI account and a valid target knowledge-base ID. The clearest exploit path is a user who legitimately has read access to a knowledge base but not write access. ## Source Evidence The normal single-file knowledge add endpoint checks write permission before processing or inserting the relationship: - `backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py` - `add_file_to_knowledge_by_id` - Lines 714-728 reject callers who are not owner, admin, or granted `write` access. - Lines 750-766 then process and insert the file only after that authorization gate. The upload auto-link path does not perform the same check: - `backend/open_webui/routers/files.py` - `process_uploaded_file` - Lines 178-186 read `knowledge_id` from upload metadata and immediately call `Knowledges.add_file_to_knowledge_by_id(...)`. - Lines 187-192 call `process_file(... collection_name=knowledge_id ...)` after the insert. The model method inserts the relationship without validating the caller's write access to the knowledge base: - `backend/open_webui/models/knowledge.py` - `add_file_to_knowledge_by_id` - Lines 646-677 create and commit a `KnowledgeFile` row for the supplied `knowledge_id`, `file_id`, and `user_id`. The later vector write check exists, but it runs too late: - `backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py` - `process_file` - Lines 1587-1592 call `_validate_collection_access(..., access_type='write')` when a collection is supplied. Because the unauthorized `KnowledgeFile` row is already committed before that check runs, the failed vector processing does not undo the knowledge-base file association. The upload code catches the exception at `backend/open_webui/routers/files.py` lines 194-195 and logs a warning while leaving the row in place. The unauthorized relationship affects file access decisions: - `backend/open_webui/utils/access_control/files.py` - `has_access_to_file` - Lines 41-53 grant file access when a file is associated with a knowledge base the user can access. So once the attacker's file is inserted into the target `KnowledgeFile` table, target knowledge-base readers/owners can see and fetch that file through normal knowledge/file routes. ## Reproduction Steps Use a local Open WebUI instance with two verified users: 1. As user `owner`, create a knowledge base. 2. Grant user `reader` read access to the knowledge base, but do not grant write access. 3. As `reader`, confirm the normal add-file endpoint is blocked: ```http POST /api/v1/knowledge//file/add Authorization: Bearer Content-Type: application/json {"file_id":""} ``` Expected and observed behavior for the normal route: it rejects the request because `reader` lacks knowledge-base write access. 4. As `reader`, upload a new file with the same target knowledge ID embedded in upload metadata: ```http POST /api/v1/files/?process=true&process_in_background=false Authorization: Bearer Content-Type: multipart/form-data file=@attacker-note.txt metadata={"knowledge_id":""} ``` 5. Observe that the upload request succeeds and returns the uploaded file record. 6. As `owner`, request the knowledge-base files: ```http GET /api/v1/knowledge//files Authorization: Bearer ``` 7. Observe that `attacker-note.txt` appears in the target knowledge base even though `reader` did not have write access. 8. As `owner`, request the file content: ```http GET /api/v1/files//content Authorization: Bearer ``` 9. Observe that the file is retrievable because `has_access_to_file` derives access from the unauthorized knowledge-base membership. ## Expected Behavior The upload auto-link path should enforce the same authorization contract as `/api/v1/knowledge/{id}/file/add`: - The target knowledge base must exist. - The caller must be the knowledge owner, an admin, or have `write` access. - The supplied `directory_id`, if present, must belong to the target knowledge base. - The `KnowledgeFile` association should only be inserted after authorization and processing succeed. ## Actual Behavior `metadata.knowledge_id` causes `Knowledges.add_file_to_knowledge_by_id(...)` to insert a `KnowledgeFile` row before write authorization is checked. The later collection write validation can fail, but the unauthorized membership row remains committed. ## Suggested Fix Move knowledge-base authorization before the insert in the upload auto-link path. The upload path should share the same write-access and directory validation logic used by the dedicated knowledge endpoints. One safe pattern: 1. Load the target knowledge base. 2. Require owner/admin/write access before calling `Knowledges.add_file_to_knowledge_by_id`. 3. Validate that `directory_id`, if supplied, belongs to the same knowledge base. 4. Run vector processing before inserting the membership row, or wrap processing plus insertion in a transaction/compensating cleanup so a denied or failed process cannot leave a stale unauthorized row. ## Affected packages - `open-webui < 0.10.0` ## Remediation Upgrade to a patched release: - `open-webui 0.10.0`