---
id: CVE-2026-58202
title: >-
  OpenReception: Confirmation-email links built from the request Host enable
  pending-account takeover via `POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation`
summary: >-
  OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted
  appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation
  link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The
  una…
severity: high
cvss: 8.3
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L'
cvssSource: cna
cwe:
  - CWE-640
vendor: open-reception
product: appointment-booking-software
affected:
  - appointment-booking-software < 2.0.0
published: '2026-10-23'
updated: '2026-10-23'
sourceUpdated: '2026-10-23T20:27:36.090Z'
source: CVEORG
sourceUrl: 'https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-58202'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m
    label: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/security/advisories/GHSA-w5g9-g2p4-2g4m
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819
    label: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/commit/df5432776a1a5b47c3a64d64e9d05dbe2b7a7819
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v2.0.0
    label: >-
      https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-booking-software/releases/tag/v2.0.0
tags:
  - cve.org
ingestedAt: '2026-10-23T21:38:13.060Z'
---

## Overview

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.

## Affected

- `appointment-booking-software < 2.0.0`

## Remediation

Refer to the linked advisories for vendor-supplied fixes and affected version ranges.