---
id: CVE-2026-56833
aliases:
  - GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c
title: >-
  PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside
  configured storage via path traversal
summary: >-
  PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside
  configured storage via path traversal
severity: high
cvss: 7.5
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N'
vendor: praisonai
product: praisonai
ecosystem: pip
affected:
  - 'praisonai >= 3.8.1, < 4.6.59'
patched:
  - praisonai 4.6.59
published: '2026-06-18'
updated: '2026-07-20'
source: OSV
sourceUrl: 'https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c
  - url: 'https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI'
tags:
  - osv
  - pip
ingestedAt: '2026-07-21T19:04:55.929Z'
---

## Overview

# PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal

## Summary

PraisonAI's Dynamic Context module provides filesystem-backed history and
terminal-log storage. The SDK reference describes the module as providing:

- artifact storage for tool outputs, history, and terminal logs;
- history persistence with search; and
- terminal session logging.

The module also exports agent-callable tool factories:

- `create_history_tools()` returns `history_search`, `history_tail`, and
  `history_get`.
- `create_terminal_tools()` returns `terminal_tail`, `terminal_grep`, and
  `terminal_commands`.

Those tools accept `run_id` and `agent_id` arguments from the tool caller. The
underlying stores join those values into filesystem paths without rejecting
absolute paths or `..` traversal:

```python
history_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "history"
return history_dir / f"{agent_id}.jsonl"
```

```python
terminal_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "terminal"
return terminal_dir / f"{agent_id}.log"
```

Because `run_id` can be an absolute path and `agent_id` can contain traversal,
a lower-trust prompt/user that can call these tools can read `.jsonl` and
`.log` files outside the configured Dynamic Context base directory.

## Affected Product

- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`
- Ecosystem: `pip`
- Package: `praisonai`
- Component: Dynamic Context history and terminal tools
- Current source paths:
  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/history_store.py`
  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/terminal_logger.py`
- Latest PyPI version validated: `4.6.58`
- Current `origin/main` validated:
  `1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e`
- Current `origin/main` tag validated: `v4.6.58`

Suggested affected range:

```text
pip:praisonai >= 3.8.1, <= 4.6.58
```

Representative local sweep:

- `3.8.1`: vulnerable
- `4.0.0`: vulnerable
- `4.5.113`: vulnerable
- `4.6.33`: vulnerable
- `4.6.34`: vulnerable
- `4.6.40`: vulnerable
- `4.6.50`: vulnerable
- `4.6.58`: vulnerable

## Root Cause

`HistoryStore._get_history_path()` and `TerminalLogger._get_log_path()` treat
logical identifiers as path segments, but never validate that the resolved path
stays under `base_dir`.

History path construction:

```python
def _get_history_path(self, run_id: str, agent_id: str) -> Path:
    history_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "history"
    history_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    return history_dir / f"{agent_id}.jsonl"
```

Terminal path construction:

```python
def _get_log_path(self, run_id: str, agent_id: str) -> Path:
    terminal_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "terminal"
    terminal_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    return terminal_dir / f"{agent_id}.log"
```

The agent tools pass caller-controlled `run_id` and `agent_id` directly into
these helpers:

```python
def history_tail(agent_id: str = "default", run_id: str = "default", count: int = 10) -> str:
    messages = history_store.get_last_messages(agent_id=agent_id, run_id=run_id, count=count)
```

```python
def terminal_tail(agent_id: str = "default", run_id: str = "default", lines: int = 50) -> str:
    return term_logger.tail_session(agent_id=agent_id, run_id=run_id, lines=lines)
```

There is no check equivalent to:

```python
resolved = candidate.resolve()
base = self.base_dir.resolve()
resolved.relative_to(base)
```

There is also no identifier allowlist preventing `/`, `\`, or `..` in
`run_id` or `agent_id`.

## Local PoV

Run against the latest PyPI package:

```bash
uv run --with 'praisonai==4.6.58' \
  python poc/pov_prai_cand_027_history_terminal_tools_path_traversal.py --json
```

The PoV:

1. Creates a temporary Dynamic Context base directory.
2. Creates a separate outside directory containing `secret.jsonl` and
   `secret.log`.
3. Creates legitimate in-base history and terminal log controls.
4. Calls `history_tail()` and `history_get()` with
   `run_id=<outside-dir>` and `agent_id=../secret`.
5. Calls `terminal_tail()` and `terminal_grep()` with the same traversal.
6. Confirms the traversal paths resolve to files outside the configured base.

Observed output summary from `evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58.json`:

```json
{
  "package": "praisonai",
  "package_version": "4.6.58",
  "controls": {
    "valid_history_read_works": true,
    "valid_terminal_read_works": true,
    "outside_history_file_outside_base_dir": true,
    "outside_terminal_file_outside_base_dir": true,
    "traversal_history_path_resolves_to_outside_file": true,
    "traversal_terminal_path_resolves_to_outside_file": true
  },
  "outside_history_tail": "Last 1 messages:\\n\\n[system]: PRAI-CAND-027-HISTORY-SECRET",
  "outside_terminal_tail": "PRAI-CAND-027-TERMINAL-SECRET\\nsecond line\\n",
  "outside_terminal_grep": "Found 1 matches:\\n\\n--- Line 1 ---\\n> PRAI-CAND-027-TERMINAL-SECRET\\n  second line",
  "vulnerable": true
}
```

The PoV is local-only. It does not start a server, contact a third-party
target, or use real credentials.

## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

This report does not claim that history and terminal helpers should be unable
to read legitimate history or terminal logs. The issue is narrower: logical
`run_id` and `agent_id` values can escape the configured Dynamic Context base
directory.

The controls show the intended boundary:

- legitimate in-base history remains readable;
- legitimate in-base terminal logs remain readable;
- the outside `.jsonl` and `.log` files are not under the configured
  `base_dir`; and
- the tools still disclose those outside files through traversal identifiers.

The official context reference describes history persistence and terminal
logging as filesystem-backed Dynamic Context features. The context security
documentation also treats absolute paths, path traversal, and sensitive files
as privacy/security risks. Reading files outside the configured context store
conflicts with that documented boundary.

## Impact

If a PraisonAI application exposes these Dynamic Context tools to untrusted or
lower-trust prompts, the lower-trust caller can read files outside the
configured context storage when the target file can be reached with the
tool-imposed suffix:

- `history_*` tools can disclose reachable `.jsonl` files;
- `terminal_*` tools can disclose reachable `.log` files; and
- cross-run or cross-agent context/history/logs can be disclosed if their path
  is known or guessable.

This can expose conversation history, prompts, terminal output, command logs,
tokens, API keys, cloud credentials, operational data, or other secrets stored
in JSONL/log files readable by the PraisonAI process.

The impact is confidentiality-only in the tested surface. Integrity and
availability are not claimed for this report.

## Severity

Suggested severity: High.

Rationale:

- `AV`: applies when an application exposes an agent with these tools over a
  network chat/API surface.
- `AC`: the traversal needs only chosen `run_id` and `agent_id` values.
- `PR`: an unauthenticated or public-facing agent endpoint can be exploited
  without an account. Deployments that require authenticated chat/API access
  may score this as `PR:L`.
- `UI`: the attacker directly supplies the prompt/tool argument to the
  exposed agent surface.
- `C`: conversation history and terminal logs can contain secrets and private
  operational data.
- `I:N/A`: this report demonstrates read-only disclosure.

## Remediation

Treat `run_id` and `agent_id` as logical identifiers, not path components.

Recommended fixes:

1. Reject absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components in
   `run_id` and `agent_id`.
2. Build candidate paths, call `.resolve()`, and reject any path that is not
   under `self.base_dir.resolve()`.
3. Apply the same containment helper to history append/read/search/clear/export
   and terminal log/read/search/clear/export paths.
4. Prefer opaque server-generated run and agent IDs in tool schemas.
5. Add regression tests for absolute `run_id`, `../` in `run_id`, and `../` in
   `agent_id` for history and terminal tool factories.

Minimal containment shape:

```python
def _safe_child(self, *parts: str) -> Path:
    candidate = self.base_dir.joinpath(*parts).resolve()
    base = self.base_dir.resolve()
    try:
        candidate.relative_to(base)
    except ValueError as exc:
        raise PermissionError("Context path is outside configured base_dir") from exc
    return candidate
```

Pair this with an identifier allowlist, because `run_id` and `agent_id` should
not need filesystem syntax.

## Affected packages

- `praisonai >= 3.8.1, < 4.6.59`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `praisonai 4.6.59`