---
id: CVE-2026-56262
aliases:
  - GHSA-365w-hqf6-vxfg
  - CVE-2026-56263
  - CVE-2026-56264
  - CVE-2026-56265
  - CVE-2026-56266
  - PYSEC-2026-229
  - PYSEC-2026-230
  - PYSEC-2026-239
  - PYSEC-2026-596
  - PYSEC-2026-798
title: >-
  Crawl4AI: Multiple Docker API Vulnerabilities - File Write, SSRF, Auth Bypass,
  XSS, JS Execution
summary: >-
  Crawl4AI: Multiple Docker API Vulnerabilities - File Write, SSRF, Auth Bypass,
  XSS, JS Execution
severity: critical
cvss: 9.8
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H'
vendor: crawl4ai
product: crawl4ai
ecosystem: pip
affected:
  - crawl4ai < 0.8.7
patched:
  - crawl4ai 0.8.7
published: '2026-06-16'
updated: '2026-07-07'
source: OSV
sourceUrl: 'https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-365w-hqf6-vxfg'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/security/advisories/GHSA-365w-hqf6-vxfg
  - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56266'
  - url: 'https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai'
  - url: >-
      https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/crawl4ai-server-side-request-forgery-via-direct-crawl-endpoints
tags:
  - osv
  - pip
epss: 0.00756
epssPercentile: 0.53177
ingestedAt: '2026-07-08T18:25:44.841Z'
---

## Overview

### Summary

Multiple security vulnerabilities in the Crawl4AI Docker API server affecting endpoints for crawling, markdown/LLM extraction, screenshots, PDFs, webhooks, monitoring, JavaScript execution, and configuration.

### Vulnerabilities

#### 1. Arbitrary File Write via /screenshot and /pdf (CWE-22, CVSS 9.1)

The `output_path` parameter accepts arbitrary filesystem paths with no validation. An attacker can overwrite server files (DoS) or write to any appuser-writable location.

**Fix:** Added `validate_output_path()` restricting writes to `CRAWL4AI_OUTPUT_DIR` (/tmp/crawl4ai-outputs by default). Added Pydantic `field_validator` rejecting `..` traversal sequences.

#### 2. SSRF via Webhook URL (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)

Webhook URLs in `/crawl/job` and `/llm/job` accept internal/private IPs with no validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), internal services, and Docker networks.

**Fix:** Added `validate_webhook_url()` with blocklist for RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud metadata IPs and hostnames. Validation at both job submission and send time. Explicit `follow_redirects=False`.

#### 3. Authentication Bypass on Monitor Endpoints (CWE-306, CVSS 6.5)

The monitor router was mounted without `token_dep` dependency, making all monitoring endpoints (including destructive ones like `/monitor/actions/cleanup`) accessible without authentication.

**Fix:** Added `dependencies=[Depends(token_dep)]` to monitor router. Added explicit token check on WebSocket `/monitor/ws` endpoint.

#### 4. Stored XSS in Monitor Dashboard (CWE-79, CVSS 6.1)

URLs and error messages rendered in the monitor dashboard via `innerHTML` without escaping, enabling stored XSS via crafted crawl URLs.

**Fix:** Server-side `html.escape()` on URL and error storage. Client-side `escapeHtml()` wrapper on all `innerHTML` template injections.

#### 5. Arbitrary JavaScript Execution via /execute_js (CWE-94, CVSS 8.1)

The `/execute_js` endpoint accepts and executes arbitrary JavaScript in the server's browser with `--disable-web-security` enabled, combining arbitrary JS execution with SSRF capability.

**Fix:** Disabled by default via `CRAWL4AI_EXECUTE_JS_ENABLED` env var. Added SSRF blocklist on destination URL. Removed `--disable-web-security` from default browser args.

#### 6. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key (CWE-798, CVSS 9.8)

The JWT signing key defaults to `"mysecret"` in the public source code, allowing anyone to forge valid authentication tokens.

**Fix:** Removed default value. Added startup validation rejecting weak/short secrets. Auto-generates ephemeral key when JWT enabled but no key set.

#### 7. SSRF via Direct Crawl Endpoints /crawl, /md, /llm (CWE-918, CVSS 8.6)

The primary crawl entry points (`/crawl`, `/crawl/stream`, `/md`, `/llm`) fetch arbitrary user-supplied URLs with no destination validation, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery against internal services, Docker networks, and cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254). A blocklist that only inspects the literal hostname is additionally bypassable via IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses (e.g. `[::ffff:169.254.169.254]`, `[::ffff:10.0.0.1]`), which resolve to the blocked private/metadata ranges but evade a naive string check.

**Fix:** Added URL destination validation on all crawl/md/llm entry points, reusing the SSRF blocklist (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata IPs and hostnames). IPv6-mapped IPv4 addresses are normalized to their IPv4 form before the blocklist check, closing the mapping bypass. `raw://` URLs are skipped. Validation applies at request entry, not only at fetch time.

### Workarounds

1. Upgrade to the patched version (recommended)
2. Set `CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN` to enable authentication
3. Set a strong `SECRET_KEY` (min 32 chars) if using JWT
4. Restrict network access to the Docker API

### Credits

- Jeongbean Jeon - file write, SSRF, monitor auth bypass, stored XSS
- wulonchia - file write via output_path (independent report)
- by111 ([August829](https://github.com/August829)) - hardcoded JWT, eval in /config/dump, /execute_js, hook sandbox escape
- secsys_codex - SSRF via /md, /crawl, /llm endpoints + IPv6-mapped IPv4 bypass (URL destination validation)
- Velayutham Selvaraj ([LinkedIn](https://www.linkedin.com/in/velayuthamselvaraj)) - SSRF via missing host validation in validate_url_scheme (independent report)
- IcySun & Yashon - SSRF, arbitrary file write, missing-auth-by-default, hook sandbox bypass via asyncio (independent report)

## Affected packages

- `crawl4ai < 0.8.7`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `crawl4ai 0.8.7`