CVE-2026-55982Medium▾ SunlitGitea: OIDC userinfo Endpoint Returns Identity Claims Without Enforcing API Token Scopes
▾ Sunlit zone — Low / medium · no exploitation signal
impact 27.5 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 0
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Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Aug 14.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via GHSA
0.2%
0.2% → 0.4%
The OIDC userinfo endpoint (GET /login/oauth/userinfo) accepts Gitea API tokens as bearer credentials but does not enforce API token scopes before returning identity claims.
A personal access token scoped only to read:misc can successfully retrieve user information from the OIDC userinfo endpoint, even though the same token is denied access to user-related REST API endpoints that enforce scope checks.
As a result, identity information remains accessible through the OIDC endpoint regardless of the scopes assigned to the API token.
Gitea supports scoped personal access tokens and enforces scope checks on user-related REST API endpoints.
For example, a token scoped only to read:misc is denied access to endpoints such as:
| Endpoint | Required Scope |
|---|---|
GET /api/v1/user | read:user |
GET /api/v1/user/emails | read:user |
GET /api/v1/user/orgs | read:organization |
Requests to these endpoints return:
403 Forbidden
with a scope-related error.
However, the same read:misc token can be supplied as a bearer credential to:
GET /login/oauth/userinfo
Authorization: Bearer <token>
and receives a successful response containing identity claims.
Observed claims include:
emailgroupsThe groups claim contains organization and team membership information associated with the authenticated user.
This behavior indicates that the OIDC userinfo endpoint accepts API tokens but does not apply scope restrictions before returning identity claims.
Proof-of-concept code: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Gitea_PoC-EC93/3_poc_oidc_userinfo_scope_bypass
read:misc
GET /api/v1/user
GET /api/v1/user/emails
GET /api/v1/user/orgs
Each request returns:
403 Forbidden
GET /login/oauth/userinfo
Authorization: Bearer <read-misc-token>
{
"email": "[email protected]",
"groups": [
...
]
}
Holders of narrowly scoped API tokens can obtain identity information through the OIDC userinfo endpoint regardless of the scopes assigned to the token.
The issue does not provide access to repositories, issues, pull requests, administrative functionality, or data belonging to other users.
Impact is limited to disclosure of identity information associated with the authenticated user. However, it weakens the authorization boundary established by API token scopes because identity claims remain accessible even when the token lacks user- or organization-related scopes.
code.gitea.io/gitea < 1.27.0Upgrade to a patched release:
code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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